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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction       
This second issue of the EU-Russia Centre Review is devoted to the future of EU-Russia 
relations. There is hardly a more important subject for the EU than the relationship with 
its large neighbour and the important policy areas that include political and security 
cooperation, trade and economic affairs, energy, justice and home affairs, education, 
culture, science and technology.  
 
It is no secret that both the EU and Russia have been disappointed with progress under 
previous agreements. Both the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
and the 1999 strategic partnership have failed to live up to expectations. In the 
negotiations which the EU hopes to start with Russia early next year, there is an 
opportunity both for stocktaking and to move forward into a broader framework for a 
deeper partnership. 
 
But what type of agreement should replace the PCA and what are the implications? This 
is the theme of the article by Sami Andoura and Marius Vahl who consider a number of 
options including abandoning the PCA, extending it or replacing it with a new type of 
agreement. In discussing the alternatives the authors examine the legal basis for any 
accord and their analysis quickly reveals the complexity of the issue of the treaty article 
on which the EU should base the new agreement. They conclude that the perennial 
question of the competence of the EU and its member states inevitably arises as the EU 
is likely to seek a comprehensive, mixed, multi-pillar agreement that will require 
ratification by all 25, (soon 27) member states and the European Parliament. 
 
Katinka Barysch touches on the prospects for the common economic space. She also 
argues that progress in EU-Russia relations has been frustratingly slow and outlines the 
thinking behind the move towards establishing the common economic space.  
 
Initially, a working group report led to the adoption of the four common spaces at the 
2003 St Petersburg EU-Russia summit. Then further road maps were developed and 
endorsed by the 2005 Moscow summit The author notes the limited achievements in 
the field of regulatory convergence, but insists that this is a key point for future 
cooperation. She also argues that a common economic space could help Russia 
diversify away from its current over-dependence on oil and gas in its economic structure. 
She reaches the conclusion that the problem is that the EU has limited means to 
influence Moscow to move in this direction and Moscow has no say in the formulation of 
EU rules and regulations.  
 
Russian perspectives on the future of EU-Russia relations are reviewed by Nadia 
Arbatova. She argues that the relationship is at a crossroads, and there are two 
possibilities - each going their own way or coming together to seek a partnership of 
equals. Russia is still searching for its true identity, while the EU itself is suffering an 
identity crisis as a result of difficulties with the constitutional treaty. Nevertheless, the 
author is confident that there will be a new extended treaty, as this possibility is 
supported by the Kremlin, leading ministries and business. The birth of a new strategic 
partnership between the EU and Russia could help lead towards a more open and 
transparent Russia. 
 
Arkady Moshes takes stock of the cooperation between the EU and Russia in foreign 
and security policy. He argues that, while it may look good on paper, the reality is 
different, with very little practical cooperation between the two sides. The author 
attributes this to a number of reasons including the lack of consensus within the foreign   4 
policy elite in Moscow, the impact of EU enlargement, differences over the shared 
neighbourhood and doubts about the EU as a cohesive actor.  
 
Moshes argues that the list of shared foreign and security policy interests between the 
EU and Russia is very long and if the internal problems on both sides could be overcome 
then cooperation could grow quickly. However, based on present trends this area is 
unlikely to be at the forefront of the relationship. 
 
Andrew Monaghan covers a rapidly growing priority area in the relationship, namely 
energy. He details the concern in the EU after Russia’s behaviour towards Ukraine in 
January 2006 and the veiled threats that Russia could easily divert its oil and gas 
supplies to Asia. The author argues that Russia is unlikely to try and blackmail the EU as 
it needs Europe for finance and technology to renew its outdated infrastructure. Asia is 
not, he believes an alternative to Europe, given the lack of pipelines to Asia and 
concerns about China. Prospects for closer EU-Russia energy cooperation are fairly good 
but several problems must be tackled, including Russian accession to, or observance of, 
the Energy Charter, more transparency in both cases and measures to ensure the 
sustainability of Russian gas supplies. Above all, he states, the EU needs to establish an 
internal energy policy if it wants to pursue a coherent external energy policy. 
 
Mark Entin reviews the rather limited cooperation between the EU and Russia in the 
fields of education, culture, science, research and technology. Both appear to be aware 
of existing problems and several working groups and commissions have been 
established to consider ways to expand cooperation.  
 
One of the main problem areas is the non-recognition of Russian degrees in the EU. 
Another issue hindering contact and progress, is the dismal lack of EU students studying 
Russia. But the author concludes on an optimistic note, believing that the potential in 
these areas is very high.  
 
Olga Potemkina assesses cooperation in the sensitive areas of justice and home affairs. 
She notes that this is a rapidly growing area of interaction even though this is not a 
priority in the current PCA. She discusses the prospects for visa-free travel between the 
EU and Russia and notes that both sides have a vital interest in tackling issues such as 
terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, etc., together. The author also notes the inherent 
problems of the Russian judicial system, still struggling to reform itself into a genuine 
independent structure. 
 
Finally, Marie Mendras argues that President Putin's Russia is authoritarian and 
clannish, controlled by powerful elite groups with little real interest in promoting a more 
open relationship with neighbouring Europe. She believes that the EU's inability to forge 
a common foreign policy towards Russia hinders progress still further and is a result of 
its lack of commitment, energy and invention. Older member states are criticised as 
reluctant to provoke the Putin administration, and this lack of any real engagement 
makes it easier for Russia to hide behind a curtain of isolationist rhetoric, designed 
mainly for home consumption. Any fresh impetus will have to come from the new, more 
outspoken and critical, EU members who are not afraid to bring issues to the table. 
 
The collection of articles in this Review provides a comprehensive overview of the state 
of EU-Russia relations on the eve of momentous negotiations to replace the PCA. They 
are all tinged with a healthy dose of reality, pointing to the opportunities to develop a 
new and genuine strategic partnership – if the necessary political will is there on both 
sides. It is to be hoped that our political leaders seize the opportunity. 
 
Fraser Cameron - Acting Director  5 
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction       
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) forms the contractual basis of EU-
Russian relations. It was concluded for an initial period of ten years that ends in 
November 2007. The question of the future of EU-Russian contractual relations is likely 
to dominate the bilateral agenda in the next few years, and is of great significance for 
the development of the relationship in the medium to long-term. 
 
The EU and Russia have essentially three basic options when considering the post-2007 
relationship. First, there is the possibility of abandoning the PCA without replacing it 
with another agreement. Secondly, the parties could allow the PCA to continue after the 
ten year period expires (this will occur automatically unless either side takes steps). 
Finally, the EU and Russia could conclude a new bilateral agreement to replace the PCA.  
 
The issue has been discussed between the two sides and they now apparently agree on 
the last option, with the launch negotiations of a new agreement expected in 2007. 
According to a European Commission press release of 3 July 2006 on the draft 
negotiating mandate, the new agreement “will provide an updated and more ambitious 
framework for the EU-Russia relationship … based on recognition of common values 
such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. It will cover “the whole range of 
EU-Russia cooperation”, including a “progressive deepening and development of trade 
relations and fair and open development of the energy relationship”, as well as 
“ambitious objectives on political and external security cooperation”.  
 
This raises a number of legal and political issues that will have to be addressed. First, 
the EU has never concluded such an ambitious and comprehensive agreement with any 
third country, and the EU treaties do not provide any clear guidance as to how such an 
agreement might be concluded. Secondly, the bilateral relationship has become closer 
and more challenging in the last few years, and the numerous contentious issues 
encountered will have to be addressed by the new agreement. How this is done will 
Sami Andoura Sami Andoura Sami Andoura Sami Andoura       
Sami Andoura is research fellow in the European Affairs Programme at the Royal 
Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB) in Brussels, the think tank 
associated with the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His main area of work 
covers the foreign policy of the European Union, the Common Commercial Policy, 
the EU Budget Reform, and other aspects of the EU integration process as well as 
the partnership between the EU and Russia. He was a member of the Belgian 
mission to Moscow in June 2006. Before joining the Institute, He worked at the 
Conseil de la Concurrence in Paris, and in the Brussels office of a British legal firm.  
Marius Vahl Marius Vahl Marius Vahl Marius Vahl       
Marius Vahl is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
in Brussels (since 2000) and a PhD candidate at the Catholic University of Leuven 
on a thesis on EU-Russia relations. He received an M.A. in International Relations 
from the Johns Hopkins University in 1999. At CEPS he works in the European 
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with EFTA. He has published extensively on EU neighbourhood policy, including on 
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Northern Dimension initiative, Europeanisation and conflict prevention, and 
regional co-operation in the Black Sea region.  
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have a crucial bearing on the future of the bilateral relationship between the two biggest 
political actors in Europe.  
 
Legal aspects of the new agreement Legal aspects of the new agreement Legal aspects of the new agreement Legal aspects of the new agreement       
The institutional framework of the European Union is based on the principle of 
attributed competence, and every international agreement concluded by the EU must 
therefore be grounded in one or more of the legal bases offered by the treaties. 
Therefore, certain legal issues regarding the future agreement between Russia and the 
EU directly must refer back to the division of competences between the EU and its 
Member States - at the risk of reopening Pandora’s box on the debate on the foundation 
and scope of Community competence, which was an issue at the time of the negotiation 
of the last PCA between Russia and the EU. 
 
According to the European Commission, the future agreement should be a 
comprehensive agreement covering many different areas of cooperation. However, 
nothing in the Treaty or in the case law of the European Court of Justice provides for 
specific rules for the conclusion of such comprehensive agreements when they cover 
the whole field of external relations. There are therefore a variety of possibilities 
regarding the type of agreement that such a comprehensive treaty of this kind could be.  
 
First of all, it could be an agreement comparable with the model of the current PCA of 
1994: an agreement mainly concluded on commercial issues, but also covering other 
matters. Such an agreement could be concluded, for example, on the basis of Articles 
133 (Common Commercial Policy), 175 (Environment), 170 (Research and 
Development) and 300 of the EC Treaty.  
 
An alternative would be to conclude an association treaty, although this would not solve 
the question of the contents of the agreement. Article 310 EC, which provides for the 
conclusion of association agreements, is very brief and provides little guidance as to the 
scope and level of commitments of such associations. In practice, the Community has 
followed a pragmatic approach. Association treaties come in a wide variety of forms, 
some of which are highly significant in terms of business or trade, while others are 
much less developed. Such association treaties could offer certain advantages for the 
relationship between the EU and Russia.  
 
The scope of the agreement could be very large, containing elements of economic 
integration, political dialogue, and all other factors linked to the partnership. It would 
create increased flexibility in the relationship, given that the scope of the agreement 
would not be limited to its specific initial legal basis as in the case of the PCA. However, 
one has to take into account the widespread perception that association treaties 
concluded with neighbouring countries have accession to the EU as their ultimate goal.  
 
It is unlikely that this is an impression which either party to this agreement would want 
to create, as it has been stated, for example, by Russia in its Medium Term Strategy on 
relations with the EU. On the other hand, an association treaty could be viewed as an 
alternative to EU membership and signal the opportunity to create a strategic and 
privileged partnership between both actors. 
 
Finally, and if the parties intend to extend the scope of the future PCA to matters such 
as those covered by the Common Space on External Security and/or the Common 
Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, such an agreement would also need to be 
based on Article 24 and/or 38 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). A number of key 
issues would arise in this scenario affecting the nature of the agreement and the actors 
involved in its conclusion.  
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In so far as it would cover matters falling under the three different pillars of the 
European Union’s structure, such an agreement would have to be a multi-pillar 
agreement. The agreement would be concluded by the European Community for the 
matters of the First Pillar (Common Commercial Policy, Environment, Education, 
Culture, Research and Development …) and by the European Union for the matters 
linked to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP - second pillar) and to Police 
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM - third pillar). The problem is, 
though, that there is no provision in the Treaties providing for the rules for the 
conclusion of such a comprehensive multi-pillar agreement. 
 
Over and above all these considerations, there is the question of whether the agreement 
would be exclusively concluded by the EU or by the EU and the Member States 
themselves. The current PCA is a mixed agreement (concluded by the EU and the 
Member States), given that its scope goes beyond the competence of the European 
Community. The present ambition of both parties regarding the scope of the future 
agreement might be taken to mean that it would certainly be a mixed agreement again. 
The real question at issue with mixed agreement is the constraints that it imposes on 
the procedure for its conclusion.  
 
The relevant procedural rules for the negotiation, signature, conclusion and 
implementation of an international agreement by the European Community are 
contained in Article 300 EC. According to this article, it is the EU Council that takes the 
decision by qualified majority or unanimity, depending on the type or content of the 
agreement, under the same rules as apply to the conclusion of the agreement. The 
European Commission conducts negotiations in accordance with a mandate issued to it 
by the Council, subject to political review by the Council through the special committees 
comprising national representatives.  
 
If the agreement were to be a multi-pillar agreement however, it would be subject to a 
different procedure. According to Article 24 TEU, which contains the relevant provisions 
for concluding international agreements concerning the second and third Pillars, those 
agreements are negotiated by the presidency of the Council, the Commission being only 
“fully associated” with this process.  
 
Thus, one could consider two different negotiators: the presidency of the Council for the 
matters related to the CSFP and PJCCM, and the Commission for EC matters. But who 
would be responsible for the negotiation of horizontal aspects such as the preamble of 
the agreement and the setting up of the institutional framework? One could foresee 
that the Council could, when authorising the Commission to conduct a negotiation 
pursuant to Article 300 EC, instruct it to include the matters reserved for the presidency 
and the Member States in order to make this process more practical.  
 
In this way, the Member States agreed, in 1994, to mandate the Commission, in contact 
with the ‘Article 133 Committee’, to negotiate all aspects of the current PCA, including 
those under their restrained competence. As a consequence, the coherence, unity and 
uniformity of the EU’s position prevailed. We can hope for similar consensus in the 
negotiation of the future agreement. 
 
With regard to the conclusion of the agreement by the EU, the question of whether the 
agreement should be concluded under qualified majority or unanimity voting arises 
from the complex nature of such a ‘comprehensive mixed multi-pillar agreement’. Given 
that certain matters covered by the agreement would be governed by qualified majority 
voting, and that others would be subject of unanimity voting, how could the EU 
institutions proceed? Would they have to divide all parts of the agreement and to 
proceed to separate voting for each different matter covered by the agreement? Or   8 
would it be conceivable to vote on the agreement as a whole package, without 
distinguishing the matters and the related voting rules, in which case, it is highly likely 
that unanimity would prevail over qualified majority.  
 
Another issue would be whether the European Parliament would give its assent to the 
new agreement as a single package, effectively giving it a veto over matters relating to 
the second and third pillars, for which it is not competent. One possible scenario could 
be to have CFSP matters negotiated by the Commission and then approved by the 
European Parliament. This situation is quite far from the supposedly intergovernmental 
nature of the EU in this policy area. All these questions remain open and would be 
resolved only by political consensus between all stakeholders, and not by the European 
Court of Justice, as this last body has the power of judicial review over the external 
agreement concluded by the EC only for community matters i.e. matters covered by the 
first pillar.  
 
A mixed agreement entails a complicated ratification process, with the ratification 
procedures of 27 Member States or more, in addition to Community procedures. The 
lengthy process and possible likely delays could give the false impression that the EU is 
dragging its feet. Facing a sometimes suspicious partner like Russia, this institutional 
clumsiness inherent to the EU integration process could be particularly inconvenient. 
One should bear in mind that a negative vote by only one Member State in the 
ratification process would be sufficient to hinder the entry into force of the agreement, 
although it should be said that so far, this has never happened with a mixed agreement 
concluded by the Community and its Member States.  
       
The substantive scope of the new agreement  The substantive scope of the new agreement  The substantive scope of the new agreement  The substantive scope of the new agreement        
The legal aspects raised above are far from the only open issues concerning the new 
agreement between the EU and Russia. There are several as yet unanswered questions 
related to the substantive scope of the agreement which will also have to be addressed.  
 
It seems clear that the EU aims for a deep and comprehensive treaty with Russia. The 
EU has already concluded many such agreements, notably with most neighbouring 
countries. These typically consist of more than 100 articles covering cooperation in 
dozens of identified policy areas, with detailed provisions set out in series of annexes 
and protocols attached to the agreements. Indeed, the PCA is itself an example of such 
an agreement, although the level of commitments is relatively low in most policy areas 
when compared with most similarly structured agreements between the EU and other 
neighbouring countries. 
 
A key argument against such a comprehensive agreement is that it is likely to entail 
long and difficult negotiations and ratification processes. Considering the sensitive 
nature of many of the various policy dossiers, it is possible that the entire agreement 
could be held up by disagreements in a few or only one policy area.  
 
There are, however, alternatives to this approach that may alleviate some of the 
concerns surrounding a new comprehensive treaty between the EU and Russia. The 
Commission press release also states that the new agreement is to provide a 
‘framework’ for the bilateral relationship. It is possible to envisage a ‘framework’ 
agreement that is broad and comprehensive in scope, but that remains quite limited in 
length and detail. Through such a ‘lighter’ and shorter framework agreement, it could be 
possible to avoid long and difficult parallel negotiations which would need to be 
concluded at the same time. Many of the detailed negotiations in the various areas and 
sectors could then be concluded separately in sector-specific agreements.  
   9 
Trade and economic relations constitute the bulk of the provisions of the PCA, and the 
EU has called for free trade to be included in the agreement, to be negotiated following 
Russia’s WTO accession. The latter is currently expected in 2007, but the process has 
seen numerous delays in the past, and an agreement on EU-Russian free trade cannot 
be negotiated and completed before Russia joins the WTO. Furthermore, a simple 
agreement on tariff-free trade would require greater concessions on the Russian side, 
as EU tariff levels vis-à-vis Russia are much lower than Russian tariffs on imports from 
the EU.  
 
The two sides have, however, higher ambitions than tariff-free trade, with the stated aim 
of economic integration based on common or equivalent rules and standards. Non-tariff 
barriers and approximation of legislation is likely to be a key sticking point in the new 
agreement. The PCA includes provisions for Russian adoption of EU legislation in 
various sectors, but Russia appears reluctant to accept such asymmetric adaptation in 
the new agreement. In the Road Map on the common economic space, this issue was 
fudged by avoiding any references to the acquis communautaire. If the economic 
relationship is to move beyond a simple free trade area, this issue must be addressed 
with greater precision and detail than in the Road Map on the common economic 
space.  
 
Energy is a central element in EU-Russian relations and has become more urgent 
following the energy crisis between Ukraine and Russia at the beginning of 2006. How, 
or the extent to which, the new agreement will deal with energy policy is likely to be 
another key issue in the negotiations of the new agreement. While the Commission 
appears committed to including energy in the new agreement, it is unclear how it will be 
squared with the proposal to conclude a new “comprehensive agreement on energy” 
with Russia, as suggested in a Commission non-paper on energy policy in June 2006.  
 
In any case, the EU and Russia will have to consider how other bilateral EU-Russian 
agreements and further agreements already under discussion will relate to the new 
agreement. While it is clear that the new agreement will replace the PCA, its 
relationship with the other agreements between the EU and Russia remains uncertain. 
In addition to the PCA, sector-specific agreements on trade in textiles and steel, a 
research agreement, and an agreement between Europol and Russia are currently in 
force.  
 
Will these agreements be incorporated into the new agreement or will they continue to 
exist as stand-alone agreements? Moreover, the question whether or not to incorporate 
into the new agreement the more than a dozen agreements currently under discussion 
across a wide range of issues (the Road Maps on the four common spaces make 
explicit references to agreements on investments, veterinary, fisheries, satellite 
navigation, trade in nuclear materials, visa facilitation, readmission, mutual legal 
assistance, Eurojust, Europol, judicial cooperation, crisis management operations, and 
information protection) will also have to be addressed. 
 
This brings us to the question of linkages between various policy areas, which was 
emphasised in the most recent review of EU-Russia relations from the Commission i.e. 
the 2004 communication. There are various ways in which agreements can be linked. 
One option is to include a legally binding link, modelled, for example, on the so-called 
‘guillotine clause’ known from EU-Swiss relations, which stipulates that a set of 
agreements must enter into force and be terminated at the same time. A looser 
‘political’ link could also be envisaged, and has indeed been the case previously in EU-
Russia relations, seen, for instance, with the WTO negotiations and Russian ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, or more recently, with the visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements.   10 
 
The question of linkages is relevant to the fundamental question of the extent to which 
the new agreement should be based on common values. While the EU has become 
increasingly concerned about the direction of Russia on fundamental issues such as 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law, Russia on its side is less inclined to 
accept a partnership based on European definitions of such common values. The EU 
Member States are themselves divided as to the optimal balance between ‘common 
values’ and ‘common interest’ in relations with Russia.  
 
This was one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations on the Road Maps, and 
was eventually resolved by including only limited and vague references to such common 
values. The extent to which further cooperation and integration should depend on 
common values is likely to be a dominant theme surrounding the upcoming 
negotiations and eventual ratification of a new comprehensive agreement between 
Russia and the EU.   
 
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions       
Given that the ambition of both parties is to approach all the dimensions of their 
relationship within a single legal instrument, the new bilateral treaty between the EU 
and Russia is likely to be a ‘comprehensive mixed multi-pillar association agreement’. 
This agreement will affect the balance between community method and inter-
governmentalism in EU decision-making. While external relations have been a source of 
conflict between the various EU institutions in the past, the inclusion of the CFSP and 
PJCCM in the new agreement between the EU and Russia raises new important 
challenges to the foreign policy-making process in the EU. 
 
A new comprehensive treaty as outlined above will also force the EU and Russia to 
confront yet again the contentious issues raised in the negotiation of the four Road 
Maps on the common spaces. Many of the divisive issues that were avoided in the Road 
Maps, for instance, whether or not the common economic space shall move beyond 
simple tariff-free trade and be based on common rules and standards, any links 
between the new agreement and other EU-Russian agreements, and the extent to which 
the relationship should be based on adherence to common values, will have to be 
addressed. 
 
In the light of all this, it seems clear that the EU and Russia are faced with difficult and 
lengthy negotiation and ratification processes before a new comprehensive bilateral 
agreement to replace the PCA can enter into force.    11 
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Mutual disillusionment has been the main feature of EU-Russia relations in recent years. 
This was perhaps inevitable: when the EU and Russia first started to build a relationship 
in the early 1990s, they knew little of each other but expected a lot. Russia – 
economically distraught and struggling to shake off the communist past – was keen to 
join a ‘common European house’. The EU was happy to help, on the assumption that 
Russia would follow the path of the Central and East European countries towards liberal 
democracy and market capitalism. The EU gave Russia money, trade and advice. It also 
offered a gradual transfer of its own laws, policies and standards of democracy, not only 
to help Russia to become a better place but also to enable it to gradually integrate with 
the Union. Although officially dubbed a ‘strategic partnership’, this original EU strategy 
was very much built on the assumption that Russia wanted and needed the EU’s help.  
 
By 2003 it had become abundantly clear that the initial blueprint was not working. 
Russia, with its weak bureaucracy and often cavalier attitude towards the law, would 
have struggled to take over EU rules, even had it wanted to. But an increasingly self-
confident Russia started to question the basic assumption that it should align itself with 
European norms, standards and values. A combination of oil windfall revenue and 
almost unprecedented political stability under President Vladimir Putin were behind 
Russia’s growing assertiveness. The EU looked on helplessly as the Putin administration 
rolled back civil liberties, took control over sections of the mass media, tightened its 
grip over the energy sector and made angry gestures towards its smaller neighbours.  
 
EU-Russia relations, meanwhile, have made little headway. Despite a proliferation of co-
operation agreements, working groups and dialogues, progress in most areas has 
remained frustratingly slow. Today, grand summit declarations can no longer hide the 
fact that the two sides do not agree on what their partnership should look like. Day-to-
day dealings between the two sides are marred by misunderstandings and mistrust. 
Disagreements abound, be it over elections in Ukraine and Belarus, disrupted gas 
supplies or fees that European airlines pay for flying over Siberia.  
 
Russia and the EU: basic figures Russia and the EU: basic figures Russia and the EU: basic figures Russia and the EU: basic figures       
  EU EU EU EU- - - -25 25 25 25        Russia Russia Russia Russia       
Population, million  459  143.4 
Area, 1,000 km2  3,191  17,075 
GDP, US$ bn  13,400  764 
GDP per head, US$  29,200  5,300 
Exports, US$ bn  3,920  240 
Imports, US$ bn  3,960  125 
Sources: European Sources: European Sources: European Sources: European Commission, EIU.    Commission, EIU.    Commission, EIU.    Commission, EIU.         
Katinka Barysch Katinka Barysch Katinka Barysch Katinka Barysch       
Katinka Barysch joined the Centre for European Reform (CER) in July 2002 as chief 
economist. She previously worked as an analyst and editor for the Economist 
Intelligence Unit in London, specialising in eastern Europe and Russia. Prior to this, 
she was a consultant in Brussels, where she was also involved in formulating the 
European Commission's strategy towards the eastern European candidate countries. 
Her own research focuses on economic transition in eastern Europe and EU 
enlargement, as well as European macro-economic policy co-ordination and the 
political economy of structural reforms. She also supervises the CER's research 
programme on Russia. Her main areas of expertise include: economic reform, macro-
economic policy co-ordination and EU enlargement. 
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Both the EU and Russia have begun to rethink their mutual relationship. There has been 
a noticeable shift from declaratory diplomacy to pragmatic co-operation.1 At a time 
when many observers talked about a ‘crisis’ in EU-Russia relations, there have been 
multiple small successes. For example, over the last three years, the EU and Russia 
have managed to: agree the terms of Russia’s WTO accession; extend the PCA to the 
new member-states; make it easier for people and goods to move between Kaliningrad 
and Russia proper; thrash out plans for building four ‘common spaces’; re-launch their 
security and defence co-operation; set up new co-operation forums, such as the 
‘permanent partnership council’ for transport questions and an expert group on 
removing trade barriers; promise to ease visa requirements; sign a declaration on non-
proliferation and a tax deal; established a new European Institute in Moscow to train 
more Russia EU specialist; and intensify co-operation in counter-terrorism and between 
Russian police forces and Europol.  
 
The experience of working together in all these different areas – frustrating as it may be 
at times – is itself valuable. It familiarises Russian officials with how the EU works and 
vice-versa. It is teaching the EU and Russia a lot about what they like and dislike about 
each other. Diplomats and officials are now spending less time on debating principles 
and ‘shared values’. Instead, they are exploring how common or diverging values and 
interests impact on everyday co-operation.  
 
Trade and the common economic space Trade and the common economic space Trade and the common economic space Trade and the common economic space       
Trade and energy must be at the heart of this new approach because it is in these areas 
that mutual and shared interests are strongest. The value of EU-Russian trade has 
grown by more than 70 per cent over the last five years, and by 400 per cent over the 
last ten. In 2005, trade turnover reached €163 billion, with Russia exporting €107 billion 
to the EU and the EU selling €56 billion worth of goods to Russia. The resulting trade 
surplus – a whopping € 50 billion last year – is Russia’s biggest source of foreign 
exchange.  
 
Companies from the EU are also big foreign investors in the booming Russian economy. 
Eurostat reports that the stock of EU foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia had 
reached almost € 20 billion by the end of 2004 – and FDI inflows have accelerated 
further since then. Such statistics need to be interpreted carefully, since a lot of the FDI 
that originates in the EU is really repatriated Russia flight capital. For example, the 
Netherlands and Cyprus (both preferred locations for Russian offshore companies) each 
account for around 30 per cent of the stock of Russian FDI. Nevertheless, there is little 
doubt that West European companies are increasingly investing in the Russian 
economy.   
 
EU EU EU EU- - - -Russian trade,  Russian trade,  Russian trade,  Russian trade, € billion  billion  billion  billion       
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
EU Exports to Russia  31.4 34.3 37.1 45.8 56.4
EU Imports from 
Russia  63.0 62.0 67.8 80.7 106.7
Trade balance  -31.6 -27.7 -30.7 -34.9 -50.3
Source: European Commission Source: European Commission Source: European Commission Source: European Commission       
 
It is perhaps not surprising that the EU and Russia have put economic integration at the 
heart of their efforts to build a stronger partnership. Ever since the early 1990s, the two 
                                                
1 Katinka Barysch, ‘The EU and Russia: Strategic partners or squabbling neighbours?’, Centre for 
European Reform, May 2004.    13 
sides have been talking about building a ‘common economic space’ (CES).2 The basic 
idea is to give Russia improved access to the EU’s single market, provided that Russia 
brings its standards and regulations in line with the acquis communautaire (the EU’s 
accumulated rulebook).  
 
In 2001, the two sides set up a high-level group to lead the process and a team of 
economists set to work to thrash out the details.3 However, when the high-level group 
reported to the Rome EU-Russia summit in November 2003, it still did not have a 
workable road map for economic integration. It only listed some guiding principles but 
stated that it was still too early to set concrete targets. Irrespective of these difficulties, 
the EU and Russia have since put the ‘common spaces’ concept at the heart of the 
attempted shift away from grand rhetoric and towards pragmatic co-operation. At their 
St Petersburg summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to build four ‘common 
spaces’ – in addition to economics and trade, they are now seeking closer co-operation 
in internal security; foreign and security policy; and science, education and culture. 
 
It took the EU and Russia another two years to agree on a plan for filling the spaces. 
These so-called ‘road maps’ were adopted at the EU-Russia summit in Moscow in May 
2005. Although the 52-page document lists hundreds of possible measures and 
institutions, it contains few concrete project proposals and no deadlines. One expert 
therefore describes it as “another exercise in a reasonably courteous management of 
ambiguity”.4  
 
Under the four common spaces agreement, the concept of the CES was expanded to 
include energy (dealt with elsewhere in this volume). But at its core remain measures to 
facilitate trade and investment, and help Russia to ‘converge’ towards EU regulatory 
norms and standards. However, although the EU and Russia have now been talking 
about legal approximation and harmonisation for almost a decade, they have made 
remarkably little progress.  
 
Box: The road map for the CES 
 
A selection of possible measures to be adopted for building a common economic space 
between the EU and Russia: 
 
•  Regulatory convergence, for example in telecoms, automotive, pharmaceuticals; EU 
and Russia to set up a regulatory dialogue and increase transparency; establish 
where there is scope for harmonising laws; similar on financial services 
•  Public procurement: Russia to take over EU best practice on public tenders; 
establishment of a dialogue 
•  IPR: Establishment of a dialogue on the protection of intellectual property rights; 
Russia to learn from EU experience with enforcing IPR rules 
•  Competition: Russia to approximate its rules on competition policy with those of the 
EU and strengthen their implementation and enforcement; including rules on 
industrial subsidies (state aid) 
                                                
2 The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, signed in 1994 and in force since 1997, stipulates that 
“Russia shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the 
Community. The term ‘common European economic space’ first appeared in the EU’s Common 
Strategy of 1999.  
3 Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy, Common Economic Space: Prospects of Russia-EU 
relations. Tacis, 2002.  
4 Michael Emerson, ‘Four common spaces and the proliferation of the fuzzy’, Policy brief 71, Centre 
for European Policy Studies, May 2005.    14 
•  Investment: Russia to improve the transparency and predictability of its investment 
climate; more systematic dialogue with the EU on investment regulations, including 
prior notification of changes and impact assessment; strengthen role of business in 
this area; Russia to ensure better implementation of rules across all regions; EU and 
Russia to explore the possibility of an agreement on investment-related issues 
•  Economic and industrial policies: dialogue on how internal investment conditions 
can be improved, especially for SME; sectoral dialogues on cars, textiles, aerospace, 
mining and metals, chemicals, etc 
•  Agriculture: approximation of food standards; EU and Russia to seek veterinary 
agreement or at least work harder to avoid trade disputes 
•  Trade and customs: use compatible computer systems; harmonise rules for 
example on risk assessment; build up capacity in Russian customs administration 
with EU technical assistance 
 
Until 2005, the EU and Russia were very much focused on reaching a bilateral deal for 
Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and they had little time and 
energy for working on the CES. But even after the bilateral deal was struck in May 2005, 
the EU has struggled to get Russia interested in the kind of legal approximation that 
underlies the CES.  
 
Many economists, both from Russia and the EU, are sceptical about the whole idea of 
the CES. They say that the gap between the EU’s well developed and densely regulated 
market and Russia’s shaky, oil-dependent transition economy is so wide as to make the 
CES meaningless as a framework for concrete policy measures. Russian experts insist 
that that only a small part of the acquis – notably the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and people – would be good for Russia’s development. Other EU rules, for 
example environmental and social standards, could harm Russia’s growth prospects. 
Most of the acquis would be either irrelevant or have little impact.5 
 
The European Commission has reassured Russia repeatedly that it would not have to 
take over the whole acquis. But some EU member-states fear that Russia will ‘cherry 
pick’ those parts of the acquis that it likes but reject those that are difficult, restrictive or 
expensive. Such a selective approach, they fear, could give Russia an unfair advantage.  
 
Most importantly perhaps, the CES concept is politically flawed. Countries that want to 
join the EU have a strong incentive to take over EU rules and regulations, irrespective of 
whether they suit them or not. Russia, however, has no intention of joining the EU and 
the EU has not invited Russia to do so. Therefore, the CES would ultimately require 
Russia to play according to rules the development of which it cannot influence.  
 
The basic idea is thus similar to that underlying the European Economic Area (EEA). 6 
The EEA gives non-EU members such as Norway and Iceland full access to the EU single 
market. In return, these countries implement the acquis in all relevant areas. Although 
the EU consults EEA countries in the law-making process, it does not give them a say 
when it decides on new rules. This asymmetry has led many former EEA members to 
apply for EU membership, including Sweden Finland and Austria. Norway and Iceland 
have their own problems with the EEA model.  
 
                                                
5 Vladimir Mau and Vadim Novikov, Otnosheiya Rossii i ES: Prostranstvo Vybora ili 
Vybor Prostranstva?, Voprosy ekonomiki 6, 2002. Peka Sutela, ‘EU, Russia and the common economic 
space’, Bofit online, number 3 2005.  
6 Tim Gold, The European Economic Area as a model for the wider Europe. Background paper for the 
EFTA parliamentary meeting, June 2003.    15 
Given that Russians are more prickly about sovereignty than say, Norwegians, anything 
resembling the EEA model would be very difficult to accept. What is more, past plans for 
the CES would not even have allowed Russia the consultative role that the EEA countries 
enjoy.7 Russian officials and politicians made it clear from the beginning that they 
dislike the idea of having to unilaterally adapt to EU rules. Instead, they have been 
calling for a more “balanced” approach to legal approximation in which both sides 
converge towards each other and new rules involve mutual consultation. In recent years, 
that stance has hardened. Many in Russia say that the CES idea was born at a time 
when Russia was weak. Now that the Russian economy is booming and political 
stability has been restored, Russia wants to establish a more “equal partnership”. This 
appears to be Russia’s main objectives for the forthcoming negotiations on a new 
agreement with the EU to replace the 1997 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
(PCA).8  
 
EU officials, on the other hand, remain adamant that non-members cannot be part of EU 
internal decision-making. And they point out that the acquis is a complex body of law 
that has grown over decades and often embodies delicate compromises among the EU 
member countries. It also often embodies international best practice and has served 
the EU well in building a well-functioning internal markets. In short, the EU cannot and 
will not adjust its laws to Russia. The process would be one-sided or not at all.  
 
The way forward?  The way forward?  The way forward?  The way forward?        
Perhaps realising that regulatory convergence is not the most promising way forward, 
the EU in July 2006 suggested that it could open talks on a free trade agreement (FTA), 
as part of the negotiations on a post-PCA agreement. So far, however, Russia has not 
shown that much enthusiasm for the idea. Russia may suspect that the EU could link 
the offer of free trade to demands to make the Russian energy sector more open and 
competitive. 
 
However, at present, the FTA ‘carrot’ simply does not look juicy enough for Russia to 
compromise on vital questions such as energy sector reform or third-party access to 
pipelines. It is true that exports to the EU account for 15-20 per cent of Russian GDP. 
But most of this consists of energy and other raw materials which are hardly affected by 
EU trade policy. The EU, on the other hand, sells Russia machinery, cars, chemicals, 
consumer goods and foodstuffs. But for the EU, Russia remains a market of secondary 
importance: in 2005 Russia accounted for only 5 per cent of total EU external exports. 
Moreover, both sides have always insisted that talking about a free trade agreement 
would only make sense once Russia has actually joined the WTO. However, the 
accession process is taking longer than most observers had expected9, as Moscow 
struggles to reach a bilateral deal with Washington against the backdrop of a chillier 
Russia-US relationship. In September, Igor Shuvalov, a senior Putin adviser, even 







                                                
7 Marius Vahl, Whither the CEES? Political and institutional aspects of closer integration between the 
EU and Russia, in T. de Wilde and L. Spetschinsky (ed.), La politique étrangère de la Russie et ses 
implications pour l'Europe, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2004 
8 Michael Emerson, Fabrizio Tassinari and Marius Vahl: ‘A new agreement between the EU and 
Russia: Why, what and when?’ CEPS policy brief no. 103, May 2006. 
9 Katinka Barysch, Pascal Lamy, Maxim Medvedkov and others, ‘Russia and the WTO’, Centre for 
European Reform, December 2002.    16 
Composition of EU-Russian trade, € billion, 2005 
  EU exports to Russia  EU imports from Russia 
  € bn  % of total  € bn  % of total 
Machinery   20.8  36.9  0.7  0.7 
Transport 
equipment 
5.7  10.1  0.5  0.5 
Chemicals  8.2  14.5  3.5  3.2 
Farm products  8.0  8.8  2.4  2.3 
Oil & gas  0.3  0.6  68.7  64.4 
Textiles and 
clothing 
2.6  4.6  0.2  0.2 
Source: European Commission.  
 
In line with Russia’s current specialisation, the Putin administration now concentrates 
on seeking ‘security of demand’ for its oil and gas sales, rather than securing better 
market access for its manufactured goods. This choice of priorities is as rational as it is 
short-sighted. The Russian economy is doing well on the back of the current oil boom. 
But it is becoming dangerously exposed to the vagaries of the international 
commodities market. Not only export revenues, but also the state budget and 
investment spending are intimately linked with international oil prices. Resource 
dependent economies are not only unstable, they also tend to be badly run as the huge 
revenues available from oil exports foster cronyism, crime and corruption. Between 
2004 and 2005 Russia dropped from 90th to 126th place (on a list of 156 countries in 
the Corruption Index) and now ranks alongside Niger, Sierra Leone and Albania.  
 
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion       
President Putin and his team are very aware of these problems. The government has 
launched a series of initiatives aimed at diversifying the economy away from 
hydrocarbons and fighting widespread corruption. During his first term, Putin tried to 
clean up Russia’s regulations and licensing procedures to make life easier for 
businesses – especially smaller ones – and remove opportunities for bribe-taking. More 
recently, the Kremlin is setting up a number of ‘special economic zones’ to attract 
foreign and domestic investment into high-tech ventures. The preparations for WTO 
entry have also entailed some valuable changes, for example a simplification customs 
procedures.  
 
It appears that the Russian government knows what is required to make the economy 
more open, competitive and transparent. So there might be an opportunity for the EU to 
‘sell’ the CES to Russia as being in Russia’s own best interest. It could help the 
development of the non-oil sector and generally create a better business environment. If 
more Russian goods were produced in accordance with EU requirements (for example 
food or safety standards) they could be more easily sold to EU countries. The EU would 
also ‘reward’ reform progress in Russia with removing remaining restrictions on Russian 
non-oil exports. EU rules often represent international best practice, so they are better 
suited for a modern market economy than Russia’s complex, often outdated and at 
times contradictory legal base. EU rules for say, competition policy and public 
procurement could help to establish a level-playing field in an economy where large, 
well-connected companies still too often stifle smaller, nimbler competitors. In short, 
regulatory convergence could help Russia’s attempt to diversify its economy away from 
oil and gas. Russia needs to understand that the CES is not a burdensome EU demand 
but an opportunity for its own economic development.    17 
Russia Russia Russia Russia- - - -EU Relations: Still at the Crossroads EU Relations: Still at the Crossroads EU Relations: Still at the Crossroads EU Relations: Still at the Crossroads       
       
From Crisis to Turning Point From Crisis to Turning Point From Crisis to Turning Point From Crisis to Turning Point       
In spite of Russia and the EU having common Russian and EU interests in many 
spheres, above all in the international security and energy sectors, and continuing 
intensive contact, including the Russia-EU summits, one of the most fashionable topics 
in academic discussions today is whether there is a crisis in relations between two 
partners.  
 
If one defines a crisis as the threat of a collapse in EU-Russia relations, there is no crisis, 
because the interdependence of the two partners is high. Even during the Cold War, the 
USSR and the West were able to cooperate in many spheres, notably in trade and arms 
control, but it made little difference to the overall nature and character of these 
relations. If we agree to define a crisis as a turning point, a condition of uncertainty 
leading to decisive change, we should recognise that there is a crisis in EU-Russia 
relations because of the absence of clear strategic goals and mutual trust. The partners 
have approached a fork in the road and it is not clear whether they will travel together 
or take divergent paths.  
 
The crisis has not arisen overnight. Many of the problems in Russia-EU relations after 
the disintegration of the USSR have acquired a qualitative character. The expectations 
of each side with regard to the other have not been fulfilled. The EU expected that 
Russia would build a functioning democracy and introduce market economy reforms 
overnight. Russia expected cooperation with the European Union to deliver an economic 
miracle and help her find a proper place in post-Cold War Europe.  
 
Changes in the EU and Russia Changes in the EU and Russia Changes in the EU and Russia Changes in the EU and Russia       
Both partners are still undergoing deep internal transformations. After the French and 
Dutch “no” votes on the European Constitution, the European Union is undergoing a 
deep internal crisis comprising three elements: 
 
•  the crisis of its previous strategy based on simultaneous and supposedly painless 
implementation of two key processes of European integration; 
•  widening and deepening of the crisis over its institutions; 
•  the legitimacy crisis that embodies a growing gap between political elites in EU 
countries and their respective electorates.  
 
In order to relaunch a new integration strategy, the EU needs stability on its borders. 
From this point of view, Russia is one of the most important neighbours of the European 
Union because stability in the post-Soviet space, and in Europe at large, will depend on 
Russia’s domestic transformation. 
 
Russia is still in the process of re-establishing her statehood and international position 
after the chaos of the first decade of post-Communist evolution. President Putin has 
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never made a secret of the fact that he is going to build a strong state, reduce the 
informal influences established under Yeltsin, and strengthen the integrity of the 
Russian Federation. This has been basically accepted by the EU and the United States, 
who were becoming tired of Russia’s controversial development under Yeltsin.  
 
At the same time, and on many occasions, Vladimir Putin has reaffirmed Russia’s 
European vocation and her readiness to promote market economy reforms. In his last 
annual address to the Russian Parliament (May 2006), the European Union was singled 
out as Russia’s main foreign partner after the CIS countries. 
 
The future of EU-Russia relations, will depend a great deal on what the EU countries with 
a long history of democracy want from a Russia still involved in the painful process of 
transition from communism that began just 15 years ago. Lack of trust in Russia, which 
can be partly put down to the legacy of the past and partly to Russia’s present 
development, induces the EU to distance itself from its eastern neighbour and perceive 
it chiefly in terms of “oil, gas and nuclear weapons”. If this approach prevails in the EU, it 
will have dramatic consequences for Russia’s internal evolution and could lead to a 
scenario in which EU-Russia relations are trapped between cooperation and 
confrontation.  
 
Indeed, in the absence of clear strategic goals in relations between Russia and the EU, 
there remains the danger of Russia being stuck with the role of raw materials supplier, 
and a temptation to use economic levers for political purposes, thus creating the 
possibility of new conflicts between Russia and individual EU countries. If the EU needs 
Russia as a stable and reliable partner, there needs to be a totally different scenario, 
more beneficial to European and international security, not to mention the European 
Union and Russia. 
 
A Vic A Vic A Vic A Vicious Circle ious Circle ious Circle ious Circle       
In 2007, the EU and Russia will have to agree on the future of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) – either to extend the existing, or a slightly modified 
treaty, or sign a new agreement. The PCA was first offered to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova in 1994-1995 as the lowest legal form of relations between the EU and 
third countries. The PCA still remains the main legal document for Russia-EU 
cooperation, but both parties recognise that it is now outdated. The PCA model 
represents a purely technocratic EU approach to Russia and other post-Soviet states, 
and bypasses the question of strategic goals.  
 
Beyond this, the PCA neither fully reflects the substantial changes that have taken place 
in Russia, the EU and the world, nor the experiences, achievements and new areas of 
cooperation. Russia’s membership of the WTO will deprive the PCA section on trade of 
any real meaning. As for political relations, the last decade of Russia-EU political 
cooperation has gone far beyond the limits of the PCA, regardless of mutual 
dissatisfaction, Russia and the EU closely cooperate on the most urgent problems of 
international security, be it Iran or the unresolved question of Kosovo’s status. 
 
As the date approached for EU enlargement to embrace the CEE counties, Brussels was 
confronted by the problem of its eastern borders and the necessity of defining its policy 
vis-a-vis Russia and other areas in the post-Soviet European space. At the St. Petersburg 
summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their co-operation by 
creating four long-term ‘Common Spaces’ within the framework of the PCA - a common 
economic space; a common space for freedom, security and justice; a space for co-
operation in the field of external security; and a space for research and education, 
including cultural aspects. The decisions of the St. Petersburg summit demonstrated the 
parties’ resolve to elevate the level of cooperation without changing the legal   19 
foundation. The fact is that the idea of four common spaces for cooperation cannot be 
implemented on the basis of an outdated and narrow agreement.  
 
The Moscow summit in May 2005 adopted a single package of road maps to act as the 
short and medium-term instruments for the creation and implementation of the four 
Common Spaces. The London summit in October 2005 focused on the practical 
implementation of the road maps, but despite good intentions, these road maps are too 
technical and cannot provide the necessary foundation for implementing the St. 
Petersburg initiative. Their development can be assessed more as process than 
progress. 
 
The Brussels strategy vis-à-vis the post-Soviet space has been further developed within 
the framework of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, a policy directed at the stabilisation of 
the Union’s immediate neighbourhood. In the first draft (“Communication on Wider 
Europe”), which was criticised in Russian political and academic circles, Russia was put 
in a group with Southern Mediterranean countries. This draft did not define any clear 
priorities for the EU’s neighbourhood, which was regarded as one integral space. The 
final draft (“The EU Neighbourhood Policy”) has entirely excluded Russia from the EU 
strategy. This document defines Russia as ’an EU strategic partner’, but it says that EU-
Russia relations will be built around the St. Petersburg decision on the four Common 
Spaces of cooperation.  
 
What is the balance sheet of EU-Russia relations? We have the outdated PCA, the 
brilliant St. Petersburg initiative, which cannot be implemented on the basis of an 
outdated PCA, and the EU Neighbourhood Policy that excludes Russia and refers to the 
St. Petersburg initiative as a foundation for strategic partnership. As has been 
demonstrated this cannot advance within the present framework without major 
changes. It appears as though EU-Russia relations are now trapped in a vicious circle. 
 
The only way to get out of this vicious circle is to create a new legal foundation for the 
St. Petersburg decision that, if implemented, could upgrade the level of the EU-Russia 
partnership and tackle other problems, the energy dialogue and the CIS. Upgrading 
relations between Russia and the EU, drawing closer not only on the basis of common 
interests but also common values, would remove or greatly diminish the chances of a 
clash of interests regarding the CIS (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia and Byelorussia). In 
other words, the stability of greater Europe and the effectiveness of multilateral 
cooperation in countering new threats to international security hinge on how the “2007 
problem” will be solved. 
 
Without a new legal form for the relationship, the EU’s potential enlargement with the 
CIS will be opposed by Russia, a contrast to her initially positive attitude towards the 
EU’s widening strategy. The last wave of enlargement demonstrated that although NATO 
membership for EU applicant countries is not part of the Copenhagen criteria, it has 
defacto become a necessary precondition for joining the EU. These two enlargement 
processes, which have been presented as complementary, will create serious problems 
in the post-Soviet space because the latter, unlike central and eastern Europe, is still 
unstable. 
 
The Moment of Truth The Moment of Truth The Moment of Truth The Moment of Truth       
As far as the fate of the PCA is concerned, there are three possible options for 
formalising relations between the EU and Russia in an international agreement beyond 
2007:  
 
1.  Extend the PCA, as stipulated under Article 106 of the Agreement, until such time 
as the parties deem it practicable to replace it with a new agreement.   20 
2.  Introduce amendments and additions to the existing text of the Agreement to take 
account of the present level of “advanced cooperation” and the real prospects for 
developing relations over the next 10-15 years. 
3.  Prepare a completely new agreement. 
 
A year ago, the Russian NGO, “Russia in a United Europe Committee” (www.rue.ru), 
created to promote partnership between Russia and the EU, initiated a broad discussion 
on the so-called 2007 problem, post-PCA, following the presentation of its concept. This 
discussion resulted in the emergence of different ideas, ranging from a minimalist 
approach (“PCA-plus”) to an ambitious vision of a new treaty. The extension of the 
existing PCA in 2007, which would be confirmation that the partners were not ready for 
closer interaction, could, of course be “sweetened” with a non-binding political 
declaration on “strategic partnership”, and a series of agreements that could be 
concluded from time to time for specific tasks. Many in Russia and in the EU are leaning 
towards this “low-cost” variant that would not require a new ratification of the 
agreement. 
 
The main concept of the “Russia in a United Europe Committee” is aimed at a thorough 
modernisation of the PCA by introducing amendments that could radically change the 
content of the treaty, and even its name, but still preserve legal continuity (a common 
practice in the EU and in the State Duma of the Russian Federation). Their ultimate goal 
of a renewed Agreement would be an association based on the concept of an advanced 
(strategic) partnership that in turn would be based on the four Common Spaces. The 
agreement would be for an indefinite period and would define each of the Common 
Spaces. 
 
Different Associations Different Associations Different Associations Different Associations       
There is a common misconception that the main difference between partnership and 
association is that an association envisages membership of the European Union as the 
final goal. For a multitude of reasons, this is not a viable proposition today for either 
Brussels or Moscow. The main difference between the PCA and an association 
agreement is that the former has no provision for the liberalisation of the movement of 
goods, people, services and capital, while the latter is based on free trade. Although a 
PCA does mention the creation of a free trade zone as an ultimate goal, it does not 
contain provisions for practical steps in this direction.  
 
Beyond this, there are several types of association agreements that have different 
names and content, and which do not necessarily lead to full EU membership: the 
European Agreement (for CEE countries); the Agreement on Association and 
Stabilisation (for the Western Balkans); and the European-Mediterranean Agreement 
(for the countries of the Southern Mediterranean). European Agreements mention EU 
membership both in the preamble and in the first articles. The first articles of 
Agreements on Association and Stabilisation with Macedonia and Croatia say nothing 
about their possible membership of the EU, but the preambles do refer to them as 
potential candidates. As for Agreements on Association with Mediterranean countries, 
the prospect of their membership of the EU is not considered at all. This form of 
association is the lowest that applies to political cooperation. 
 
From the legal point of view, relations between the EU and EFTA are also associations; 
indeed, the highest forms of association. It is significant that many supporters of 
Russia’s self-reliance, while advocating that Russia-EU relations be patterned on the 
Swiss or Norwegian models, do not even realise that they are calling for the highest 
level of association. All the EFTA countries – Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein – meet EU membership criteria but their non-membership is a matter of 
their free choice. From the point of view, of the Committee for “Russia in a United   21 
Europe”, an association between the EU and Russia should more resemble the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements, and avoid the question of Russia’s 
membership of the EU. Nonetheless, even this moderate concept is too frightening for 
the partisans of a minimalist approach, in both Russia and the EU.  
 
It appears that there will be a new treaty replacing the PCA and regardless of its name, 
it should be based on the four Common Spaces for cooperation. This could provide not 
only a good structure for the new treaty but also the strategic goals that are badly 
needed in the EU-Russia relationship. If, in the best-case scenario, these Common 
Spaces of cooperation develop, the very question of Russia’s membership of the EU will 
become irrelevant. 
 
Official and Business Views Official and Business Views Official and Business Views Official and Business Views       
The official position of Russia’s top leadership and the state structures responsible for 
the formulation and implementation of foreign policy (predominantly the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) is to favour a new treaty based on the four Common Spaces and special 
sectoral agreements. The government is not considering association, as it desires that 
Russia be “an equal partner of the EU”. The very fact that the Kremlin understands the 
importance of a new and more comprehensive treaty with the EU is a positive sign in 
Russia’s foreign policy evolution.  
 
As for Russian business, as in any country with developing business structures, there is 
a tendency to protectionism and this has been most vividly evident in domestic 
discussions on Russia’s membership of the WTO. At the same time, there is a growing 
understanding amongst the Russian business community, in particular the energy and 
steel sectors, that a new treaty could introduce more precise and transparent rules for 
their activities.  
       
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion       
The year 2007, when the fate of the PCA will be decided, can without exaggeration be 
described as a turning point in relations between Russia and the EU, and in the 
evolution of post Soviet Europe. How should one deal with a Russia that is far from 
perfect? It would be worthwhile to remember the advice given by George Kennan in 
1951 in his article “America and the Russian Future” where he predicted the collapse of 
the USSR: “…       when Soviet power has run its course, or when its personalities and spirit 
begin to change (for the ultimate outcome could be one or the other), let us       not hover 
nervously over the people who come after, applying litmus papers daily to their political 
complexions to find out whether they answer to our concept of "democratic". Give them 
time; let them be Russians; let them work out their internal problems in their own 
manner. The ways by which peoples advance toward dignity and enlightenment in 
government are things that constitute the deepest and most intimate processes of 
national life. There is nothing less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which foreign 
interference can do less good. There are, as we shall see presently, certain features of 
the future Russian state that are of genuine concern to the outside world. But these do 
not include the form of government itself, provided only that it keep within certain well-
defined limits, beyond which lies totalitarianism.” 
 
Undoubtedly, 2007 will mark a moment of truth for the future of EU-Russia relations 
and there will be a strong temptation on both sides to avoid too much change. But only 
a new treaty based on a strategic vision can help Russia find her proper place in post 
Cold War Europe, and change her forever.   22 














EU-Russia cooperation in the foreign and security policy spheres is well established. In 
official documents this cooperation is often prioritised as a key component of the 
emerging partnership. The Russian Mid-Term Strategy of Relations with the EU, 
presented in 1999 and valid until 2010, set the ambitious task of building a system of 
collective security on the continent. At their summit in Paris in October 2000 the two 
sides agreed to develop security cooperation. This was extremely important since, at 
that moment, Russia-NATO relations were frozen following the NATO campaign against 
Yugoslavia.  
 
The tragic events of September 11 further stimulated the security partnership between 
the EU and Russia. This was reflected in the results of the summit in Brussels in October 
2001, when Russia and the EU reached an agreement to cooperate in fighting 
international terrorism. At St Petersburg in May 2003 it was agreed to create (along 
with three other common spaces) a common space on external security. Meanwhile, 
two years later, a “road map” focused on specific areas of cooperation including 
counter-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and export controls, crisis management and 
civil protection. 
 
In principle, there should be close foreign and security policy cooperation between 
Russia and the EU, as they share many common interests and concerns. Both are 
threatened by newly emerging security risks such as terrorism. Both want a stable world 
order. Both can reinforce each other’s positions in the dialogue with the Islamic world, 
enhance stability in the common neighbourhood and, where necessary, put some 
constraints on the actions of the US. Furthermore, Russia can treat cooperation in this 
sphere as a real priority, as its claim to equality in its relationship with the EU is 
nowhere more justified than here. 
 
The reality, however, does not support this brief analysis. Most experts demonstrate a 
deep scepticism when speaking about the current state and the prospects of Russia-EU 
relations on foreign and security policy. Dov Lynch from the EU Institute for Security 
Studies has characterised it as a dialogue des sourds (a conversation of deaf people) 
that has produced “few, if any, meaningful joint positions” (The Washington Quarterly, 
Spring 2004). A Finnish researcher, Tuomas Forsberg, has asked why the opportunity to 
build an EU-Russian security partnership has been missed, treating the very fact that it 
has been missed as an axiom (European Foreign Affairs Review, Summer 2004). An 
authoritative Brussels-based scholar and former practitioner, Michael Emerson, when 
analysing specifically the crisis management aspect of the common space on external 
security, called the document “disappointing” and “empty” (CEPS Policy Brief, No. 71, 
May 2005). 
 
Arkad Arkad Arkad Arkady Moshes y Moshes y Moshes y Moshes       
Arkady Moshes is Senior Researcher, Russia and EU programme, FIIA (Finnish 
Institute for International Relations). He has a Ph.D in the history of international 
relations - British foreign and defence policy in 1980s (Institute of Europe, Academy 
of Sciences of the USSR, 1992). His areas of expertise include: Russian-European 
relations; Russia's policy towards the Western CIS and Baltic states; Internal and 
foreign policy of Ukraine; Internal and foreign policy of Belarus; Region-Building in the 
Baltic and Black Sea regions, and the Kaliningrad issue. He has authored more than 
90 academic articles and papers and co-authored several reports of the Russian 
Council on Foreign and Defence Policy.   23 
The first year and a half of implementation of the “road map” did not do much to 
counter these definitions. There seems to be little evidence of any motivation to expand 
these areas of cooperation. This means that in the mid-term perspective, cooperation 
will be driven by bureaucratic and not strategic interests, and will be developed in an ad 
hoc rather than structural and systemic manner. Also, it could involve a huge body of 
bilateral dealings between Russia and EU member states, as opposed to a coherent 
position of the Union. Meanwhile, there will remain differences about the future of the 
common neighbourhood 
       
Changing Russia Changing Russia Changing Russia Changing Russia       
There are four complicated and sometimes contradictory “baskets” of reasons, which 
help explain the above assessment. The first deals with the implications of Russia’s 
internal evolution for its foreign policy and foreign policy thinking. Contrary to oft-
repeated ritual phrases about the adherence to common values, in reality Russia does 
not adopt the standards of the rule of law and democratic governance that are 
considered the norm in the EU. Russia continuously slides down most international 
ratings that measure political freedom and human rights. Convergence of values 
between Russia and EU therefore, cannot be realistically expected to come soon, but 
without it, building a strategic partnership will hardly be possible. EU policy is or at least 
is said to be aimed at the promotion of democracy – in its own periphery above all – 
while Russia, as events in Ukraine during the Orange revolution have demonstrated, is 
treating the prospect of democratisation of its neighbours with extreme concern. 
 
Divergence of norms and values could, in principle, be put aside if the partners feel 
exposed to the same immediate security threat that would demand a common stance. 
For some time the threat of terrorism was viewed as a factor that could play the 
cementing role. Over time, however, different approaches to critical questions (how to 
define a terrorist, which organisations to include in respective lists, which means to use, 
etc.) gave grounds for mutual accusations of “double standards” and altogether 
weakened anti-terrorist solidarity. 
 
Foreign Policy Doctr Foreign Policy Doctr Foreign Policy Doctr Foreign Policy Doctrine ine ine ine       
Going back to the changes in Russia and their implications, it is important to realise 
that the so-called policy of “Russia’s European Choice”, strongly pronounced during the 
first presidential term of Vladimir Putin, was shelved after 2004 and its logic no longer 
determines Russian policy. If it had been assumed earlier that, at least for reasons of 
history and culture, if not for economic interdependence, it would be most natural for 
Russia to seek the European future, (the thinking that also drove external policy 
cooperation forward) the school of europeanisers is now a minority in the Russian 
debate. Even among liberals there is a strengthening trend to see Russia as a 
potentially Western but not necessarily European country (see, for example, Dmitri 
Trenin’s book “Integration and Identity: Russia as a “New West”, Carnegie Moscow 
Centre, 2006) that should adopt the best of “world” and not Europe’s experience. In the 
official discourse, Russia is portrayed as an independent player that should keep 
complete freedom of manoeuvre and should not build any permanent foreign policy 
alliances.  
 
Russia is shifting its attention from Europe to Asia and the impact of this process on 
Russia-EU relations is not yet known. The end of Russia’s Europeanisation and the 
weakening of the integration/ approximation paradigm facilitates the resurgence of big 
power thinking, brings back the nineteenth century logic of the “concert of powers” and 
exclusive spheres of interest which, in turn, complicates the process of reaching 
understanding with the EU where such approaches are seen as obsolete. 
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Furthermore, after Vladimir Putin’s address to the nation made in the aftermath of the 
tragedy in Beslan, (in which Russia’s president directly called the forces in the West that 
do not like strong Russia a security threat to the country) Russia experienced a growth 
of anti-Western rhetoric. However, this is not to say that Russia is preparing for a return 
to confrontation with the West; much of this rhetoric is intended for domestic 
consumption. Yet, as a result, the dilemma of whether Russia wants to guarantee its 
security together with the West or against the West has only become more difficult to 
solve. 
 
Impact of Enlargement  Impact of Enlargement  Impact of Enlargement  Impact of Enlargement        
The second set or ‘basket’ of reasons is linked to the evolution of Russian and EU 
mutual perceptions that took place after EU enlargement, which left Russia frustrated. 
Moscow’s concerns on critical issues (Kaliningrad transit, the minority situation in Latvia 
and Estonia) were taken into account mostly on paper and Russia had to extend the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to the new members without any real 
negotiations, while being offered cosmetic concessions and being put under pressure of 
losing the PCA altogether. The inclusion of a number of states that had problematic 
bilateral relations with Russia into the EU internal decision-making process further 
complicated the dialogue. 
 
The most difficult thing to adapt to was the appearance of the de facto common 
neighbourhood, somewhat misleadingly called “adjacent areas” in the joint documents 
at Russia’s insistence. Brussels cannot ignore a consolidated push of EU new members 
to be more active on the eastern periphery. As long as it denies membership 
perspective for its neighbours, the policy of Wider Europe that it pursues, (however 
palliative it may look) nevertheless stimulates their search for alternatives to staying 
within the same geopolitical and geo-economic space as Russia. Moscow, in this 
situation, starts viewing the EU not so much as a partner, but rather a systemic rival to 
its foreign policy goals in the Western NIS and the Caucasus; a revisionist power; and is 
instinctively inclined to get involved in a “zero-sum game” type of relationship with the 
EU. 
 
The EU also cannot consider Russia a status quo power. Russian foreign policy in Putin’s 
second term is based on the feeling of self-confidence, regained thanks to high world 
energy prices. Russia is no longer happy with the status quo in its relations with other 
post-Soviet states and is trying out different instruments, ranging from interfering in 
elections to withdrawing energy subsidies and banning imports of goods from certain 
countries. Today’s major points of European concern - Russia’s negative attitudes to EU 
involvement in the so-called “frozen conflicts” and Moscow’s support for Alexander 
Lukashenko in Belarus – may stay within the limits of acceptable differences because 
they are traditional. But tomorrow one cannot exclude the possibility of an attempt to 
incorporate Belarus into Russia, which will be more difficult for the EU to ignore. 
 
The Usefulness of Cooperation The Usefulness of Cooperation The Usefulness of Cooperation The Usefulness of Cooperation       
The third “basket” of arguments is related to a general assumption that the significance 
and practical usefulness of Russia-EU foreign policy cooperation in the whole complex of 
security relationships that both partners have with other countries is likely to remain 
limited. This assumption draws partly upon past experiences. Russia-EU military-
technical cooperation has never gone beyond small steps (like the EU Satellite Centre 
occasionally purchasing Russian satellite images or Russia sending several police 
officers to the EU-led mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina). After 2002, when the EU 
decided not to use Russian strategic airlift capability and to develop its own, the only 
potential big common project was buried. Brussels has never considered providing 
Russia with a voice in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which would have 
satisfied Russia’s desire for a relationship of equals.    25 
 
The reason is, in part, the lack of belief in Russia that the EU can become an influential 
foreign policy maker. From the Russian point of view, the dynamics of CFSP/ESDP have 
been very slow, while the capability to fulfil the St Petersburg tasks will not be a central 
element in the system of defence against new security threats. After the failure of the 
Dutch and French referenda on the EU Constitution, scepticism around the EU common 
policy grew much stronger in Russia, where analysts even now admit the possibility of 
the re-nationalisation of European foreign policy. It is worth noting in a different context, 
that Russia can no longer even hope to use relations with the EU to balance US actions, 
as after the last enlargement, the Atlanticist wing inside the Union has become 
stronger. 
 
Most importantly, however, Russia has an alternative within the West. In the last five 
years the NATO-Russia Council has proved to be a more convenient and more flexible 
forum for developing security cooperation between Russia and the West than Russia-EU 
mechanisms. Russia-NATO relations may again take a turn for the worse, if another 
wave of expansion took place that included Ukraine, but at the moment this scenario 
does not cause immediate concern. 
 
Where Can there be Cooperation? Where Can there be Cooperation? Where Can there be Cooperation? Where Can there be Cooperation?       
Finally, in the fourth ‘basket’ it is rather difficult to find topics and areas, where plans for 
cooperation would not provoke second thoughts. The common neighbourhood is a 
region more likely to generate conflict than to engender cooperation. Although low-key 
cooperation, in managing daily issues in the zones of “frozen conflicts” and in 
guaranteeing the security of energy transit, is possible. 
 
Moscow apparently has nothing against the EU taking responsibility for the situation in 
areas which Russia has abandoned in the strategic sense. Africa and the Balkans would 
be the first candidates. At the same time, it would be difficult to imagine why Russia 
would be interested in actively and physically supporting EU actions in those areas. On 
the contrary, Moscow may have a reserved attitude to the possible success of EU 
missions in Africa as this could establish a precedent which could increase EU 
willingness and its capability to undertake peace-keeping operations in Transdniestria 
and the Caucasus. As for the Balkans, Kosovo may set a different kind of a precedent. It 
has been indicated many times that non-recognised entities in the territory of the 
former Soviet Union could follow Kosovo’s suit, which promises another round of Russia-
EU controversy. 
 
The situation regarding Iran and the Middle East more generally represents a rare case 
which could become a success story. Russian motivation to prevent nuclear proliferation 
in the region looks strong enough. The issues that are at stake in the region have global 
effects, which make participation in their resolution imperative for any country that 
aspires to be a major player. Russia has much to contribute and its voice will not 
disappear in the negotiations. The practice of coordinating positions between Russia 
and countries representing Europe has been in place for some time and often the 
members of this group have been closer to each other than each of them was to the 
United States. At the same time, Russia’s interests are not identical to those of Europe. 
Uncertainty around Iran drives up energy prices, with Russia enjoying the benefits. 
Therefore, Russia is interested in keeping the situation under control but not necessarily 
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Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion       
In view of this analysis, the words of President Putin from his address to the meeting of 
Russian ambassadors on June 27, 2006 do not appear surprising or accidental. When 
speaking about cooperation in fighting terrorism, drug-trafficking, in peace-keeping and 
in emergencies, Putin named bilateral formats, NATO and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (formerly the Tashkent Treaty). The EU did not get a special mention. In 
another passage, Putin said that, through its dialogue with the EU and its member 
states, Russia expects to develop mutually beneficial economic ties, to extend 
academic and cultural links and to lift the barriers that impede human contacts. The 
foreign and security policy sphere was again omitted. 
 
In the short-to-medium term perspective, it is likely that Russia-EU foreign policy and 
security cooperation will proceed in a rather bureaucratic way, not significantly affecting 
the security policies of Russia and EU member states. Provisions for the “road map” 
may be partially or fully incorporated into the text of a new comprehensive document 
that is supposed to replace the current PCA. New documents of a declaratory character 
may be produced. Working dialogue will continue, sometimes producing results. 
 
But a major task of the dialogue will be to prevent the worsening of Russia-EU relations 
if things suddenly go wrong in the common neighbourhood (another Russian-Ukrainian 
gas war; the Lukashenko regime starting massive repressions or Russia going ahead 
with integrating its neighbour; an outbreak of war between the Georgian government 
and the breakaway entities of Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia etc.). In each case, it 
would be extremely important for the EU to prepare for such situations and 
transparently convey this contingency planning to Moscow. 
       
Foreign and security policy cooperation is unlikely to be a key element in Russia-EU 
relations. Priority attention will be given to energy and, possibly, some elements of the 
justice and home affairs dossier. Bilateral relations are likely to leave relations between 
Moscow and Brussels in the shadows. On one hand, Moscow will deliberately aim to 
strengthen cooperation with traditional partners from ‘Old Europe’ with Germany playing 
the lead. On the other hand, Russian-Polish and Russian-Baltic relations are likely to 
stay strained, not only because negative stereotypes are permanently reproduced on 
both sides, but also because these new members of the EU are the most active 
advocates of greater EU involvement in the NIS. 
 
In the longer term, the situation may change for the better. The list of shared EU and 
Russian interests in world affairs is long. But this positive turn will largely depend on 
Russia’s ability to give a new impulse to internal democratic evolution and to reassess 
the usefulness of standing political alliances with like-minded nations. The EU, in turn, 
would have to develop the capability of operating as a single foreign policy maker - 
globally and on its eastern periphery in particular. 
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction       
The EU-Russia energy relationship is key for both parties. EU states import significant 
quantities of Russian energy, and the EU is Russia’s largest energy market – a market 
which sustains broader Russian economic growth. The long-term background is positive. 
Both sides officially note that Russia has been a reliable energy supplier both during the 
Cold War confrontation (as part of the Soviet Union) and since 1991, even during times 
of severe domestic crisis. Nonetheless, as commentators on both sides note, mutual 
confidence is currently low. 
 
Background Background Background Background       
During the UK presidency of the EU in 2005, concerns were raised that EU dependence 
on Russian energy would reduce its ability to conduct its diplomacy with Russia. The EU, 
some argued, would need to temper its criticism of Russian action in Chechnya, lack of 
media independence, and new legislation in Russia about the registration and funding 
of NGOs so as not to provoke a reaction from Russia which might include withholding 
energy supplies.  
 
Also, there were growing concerns that an increasingly authoritarian Russia might begin 
to use its position as a key supplier of EU energy to make its own demands and use this 
power as a diplomatic lever against the EU. This view gained strength during the gas 
predicament of January 2006, when Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, which had a 
knock-on impact on the supplies of some EU member states. This action had a big 
impact in many quarters of the EU, seriously undermining confidence in Russia’s 
reliability as a supplier, even in states which do not rely heavily on Russian energy 
supplies. 
 
These concerns were again reinforced during the first half of 2006, when senior Russian 
executives seemed to threaten the stability of Russian supplies to the EU. Semyon 
Vainshtok stated that Russia had ‘overfed Europe with crude’ and repeated his 
suggestion that Russia should diversify its oil flows by building pipeline capacity to the 
Far East. Similarly, Alexei Miller, CEO of Gazprom, stated on 20th April that if the EU does 
not allow Gazprom to directly own distribution and retail natural gas infrastructure, they 
would face retaliation that could include a diversion of Gazprom’s gas to other markets, 
particularly the USA or China. This appeared to be a reaction to talk in Brussels about 
applying EU anti-monopoly regulations to it, and to reports of the UK government 
considering changes to its merger rules to prevent Gazprom taking over Centrica, the 
UK’s major gas supplier. 
 
However, even amid the heightened concerns of the last few months, it does not seem 
that energy dependence is affecting the EU’s ability to raise uncomfortable questions 
with Russia. Chechnya was discussed at some length during the summit in London. The 
EU has also criticised Russia’s new NGO legislation. In fact, if the EU continues to 
dominate Russian oil and gas export quotas – or increases them – it will be in a 
Dr. Andrew Monaghan Dr. Andrew Monaghan Dr. Andrew Monaghan Dr. Andrew Monaghan       
Dr. Andrew Monaghan is the Founder and Director of The Russia Research Network, 
an independent organisation examining developments in Russia. He is also Senior 
Research Associate at the Conflict Studies Research Centre, part of the Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, and a Visiting Lecturer in the Defence Studies 
Department, the civilian academic branch at the Defence Academy. His research 
interests include the Russian energy sector and Russia-EU relations, on which he has 
had a number of articles published. His doctoral research addressed the evolving 
security relationship between Russia and the EU.   28 
stronger position to apply more effective sanctions or boycotts against Russia in any 
major disagreement. 
 
Moreover, there has been some progress in reinvigorating the energy dialogue 
established in 2000. The energy Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) held by the UK in 
2005 provided the background for an improvement in the relationship by establishing a 
framework for greater interaction and introducing a wider range of actors in the 
dialogue, including businesses. 
 
State of Play State of Play State of Play State of Play       
The state of play therefore reflects a certain tension between a slow improvement in the 
bureaucratic relationship and the tensions in the political situation. The EU-Russia 
summit of May 2006 highlighted the ongoing political tension in the relationship. While 
underlining the strategic importance of the energy relationship and the need to enhance 
it, both sides stated their concerns about it following the summit. President Putin 
reaffirmed the Russian position that for 40 years, Russia had reliably supplied Europe’s 
energy, and should continue to be considered reliable. Moreover, he reaffirmed that he 
did not see China as an alternative to the European market, but that Russia sought to 
build partnerships on the world market. However, he noted the disagreements over the 
Energy Charter Treaty, of which more below, and many commentators in Russia noted 
that Russia was adopting an increasingly hard-line stance towards the EU in energy 
negotiations. 
 
Mr. Barroso mentioned the sensitivity of the issue of Russia cutting supplies to Ukraine 
and restated the inter-dependent nature of the relationship – Russia needs the 
European market, and should beware of alienating it. He also re-stated the EU’s 
concerns about the need to intensify the energy dialogue and deepen mutual 
understanding on the basis of the common principles of openness, transparency, 
reciprocity and market economy principles – many of which are not considered to be 
“common” by experts on the EU side, who are critical of the lack of transparency and 
openness of Russia’s energy sector. The clearest example of this, many on the EU side 
argue, is the Yukos case. 
 
Yukos was Russia’s largest company in terms of its market assets and second biggest 
in terms of profits, and many considered it to be one of the leading Russian companies 
in the move towards international business standards of transparency. The Yukos case 
has been analysed in depth elsewhere. But the break-up of the company for a variety of 
reasons – claims by the government of tax evasion, counter claims that it was a 
politically motivated attack on company CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and the evident 
desire of the state to retain control over an important share of Russian oil production 
among them – seriously undermined investor (particularly foreign investor) confidence 
in Russia. 
 
The lack of transparency and real competition in the subsequent sale of former Yukos 
assets to state-dominated companies has strengthened the impression that the state is 
seeking to control the exploitation of Russian energy reserves by re-nationalisation of 
the energy industry. President Putin has rejected such accusations – at the EU-Russia 
summit in May 2006, he asserted that Russia’s energy production and transportation 
sector is “considerably more liberal than in many other energy producing countries”, and 
“with the exception of two companies, practically all our oil companies are fully 
privately-owned and almost all of them have foreign participation”. He also noted that 
Russia had a “large number of independent producers of natural gas”. Nonetheless, the 
Russian government has made clear in official statements its belief that Russia’s 
energy reserves are the key to Russia’s revival as a great power, and the consequent 
need to remain in control of a significant part of those reserves.   29 
 
The concern in Europe about the sustainability of Russian hydrocarbon production is the 
key issue in the energy relationship. Leading officials and experts have questioned 
Russia’s continuing ability to supply gas past 2010 (despite its large reserves), and the 
efficiency of a state-dominated energy sector, and emphasise the need for major 
investment in exploration, production and infrastructure development in Russia. 
 
However, the continuing lack of clarity about property laws, licensing and tax legislation 
mean that the investment climate has remained unfavourable, especially for foreign 
firms. Concerns have again emerged recently with the threats by the Russian 
government to cancel the licences of Shell and ExxonMobil for their Sakhalin projects, 
and Total for its Kharyaginsk oil field development project. Indeed on September 18th, 
the Russian Natural Resources Ministry announced that it had decided to annul the 
approval of the Sakhalin II oil and gas project, citing environmental and management 
problems. EU energy commissioner Andris Piebalgs strongly criticised the 
announcement and stated that without a predictable investment climate in Russia, 
uncertainty about the potential of future supplies would remain. 
 
The role that state gas monopoly Gazprom plays in the energy sector in Russia is 
illustrative of the current problems. Gazprom itself faces a number of troubles – 
perhaps the most significant of which are its unclear production capabilities in the short-
to-medium term and its high dependency on international markets. In comparison to 
Russian oil production, which rose from the mid-to-late 1990s, Gazprom’s production 
fell, and although it rose in the early part of this decade, it is reliant on a small number 
of mature fields. Moreover, the domestic market, which Gazprom has to supply as a 
priority, is financially unattractive because of the low domestic prices – so in 2004, 
nearly 75% of its total income came from sales outside Russia. 
 
Nonetheless, as a monopoly, it clearly wields enormous influence in Russia through its 
control of pipeline networks (of which more below) and it has become increasingly 
active inside and outside Russia, both in terms of discussing acquisitions and in 
preparing agreements with other companies – including Algerian gas giant Sonatrach. 
This has given rise to concerns about the growth of a gas producer’s cartel. 
 
Gazprom’s role in the Russian energy sector is growing significantly with its acquisition 
of Sibneft for $13.1 billion, which will increase its oil production to 1.17 million barrels 
per day (bpd). (Rosneft, which acquired the Yukos production asset Yuganskneftegaz, 
produces 1.5 million bpd.) Although the annulment of Shell’s licence in Sakhalin on 
environmental grounds has some basis (earlier in 2006 the EBRD withheld a loan for a 
pipeline for similar reasons), some suggest that the announcement is a form of 
pressure on Shell to conclude an asset exchange deal with Gazprom (the basics of a 
deal were agreed in June). Gazprom has also considered buying out Rosneft which holds 
a 20% share in the Sakhalin I project. 
 
Second, and linked to this, the Russian state effectively controls Central Asian reserves 
because of its dominance of the transit routes through the Transneft and Gazprom 
monopolies which control access to export pipelines. One of the (many) suggested 
reasons for the attack on Yukos was because of its plans to construct additional but 
private pipeline infrastructure, both to China and to Murmansk – projects which would 
have reduced state control over exports. 
 
Moreover, if it is true that there are several important independent natural gas 
producers operating in Russia, and that they are becoming increasingly important to 
Russian gas production, it remains the case that they depend on favourable relations 
with Gazprom for access to pipelines. The Russian parliament passed legislation this   30 
summer confirming Gazprom’s control of foreign export pipelines. Therefore Gazprom 
essentially controls their growth and production development. 
 
The EU therefore seeks to improve conditions for trade in energy through non-
discriminatory transit and access to export pipeline infrastructure. However, it is unclear 
that this will provide a significant strategic improvement, since reserves in states such 
as Turkmenistan are uncertain and may also not be sustainable in the medium to long 
term. 
 
Some progress was made in this direction at the G8 conference in July, with agreement 
to invest in “all stages of energy supply” and “transparency and good governance in the 
energy sector”. The G8 leaders – including President Putin – pledged to “create and 
maintain the conditions to attract the funds into the energy sector through competitive, 
open, equitable and transparent markets”. However, if some officials on the EU side 
consider this gives them something to hold Russia to in subsequent negotiations, other 
experts consider the language to be that of the lowest common denominator and only a 
very small step forward. 
 
Prospects Prospects Prospects Prospects       
The short-term prospects are that there will be more of the same. The slow 
improvement in the framework and bureaucratic structure of the energy dialogue 
seems set to continue. Finland will seek to support this dialogue with another PPC 
during its presidency, and during its presidency in 2007, Germany is likely to continue to 
prioritise this dimension of the relationship, given the importance of Russian energy 
supplies to Germany. 
 
The interdependent nature of the relationship means that it does not seem likely that 
Russia will interrupt supply to the EU for political reasons. The importance of the 
European hydrocarbon market to the Russian economy is simply too great. 
Furthermore, discussions or statements in Moscow about the possibilities of diversifying 
away from the European market are unlikely to be fulfilled in the short term for three 
reasons. First, there is a lack of infrastructure to supply these markets. Currently, 
exports to China are by rail, which is an expensive and inefficient method of transport. 
Second, there are concerns in Moscow about the possibility of an export market 
dominated by China. Although Russia currently has good relations with China, there are 
concerns that Chinese growth might pose a threat to Russian interests in the Far East. 
Dominating Russia’s energy market would give China a potential lever against Russia 
itself. Finally, it seems unlikely that China will be as profitable for Russia – the Chinese 
market will not pay as much as the European. 
 
These points do not mean, however, that the energy relationship is cloudless or even 
that prospects are positive, for several reasons. First, Russia-Ukraine relations remain 
tense and the deal which resolved the predicament in January is murky – underlying 
reasons for the problems have not been resolved. Indeed, the potential also exists for 
another disagreement between Russia and Belarus, with similar ramifications for 
energy supplies to EU member states, since Belarus is also an important transit state. 
Moscow has stated that it will seek to raise prices for Belarus to European levels in 
2007. A clear policy needs to be developed as to how the EU intends to address this 
issue. 
 
There are also a number of principle differences between the EU and Russia. Although 
President Putin stated after the EU-Russia summit in May 2006 that there are ‘no 
problems which cannot be settled’ regarding the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the two 
sides view the Treaty very differently, as discussed in Review 1 of this series: Russian 
experts also argue that the ECT highlights the inequality of the relationship, being   31 
illustrative of “European egotism”: it is one-sided and unfair since it forces Russia to 
implement EU internal rules. The EU has been pushing Russia to ratify the treaty, and 
had hoped to do so before the summer.  
 
Andris Piebalgs remains optimistic that a deal is possible before the end of 2006, but a 
number of senior Russian officials, including Viktor Khristenko, Russia’s Energy Minister, 
and President Putin, have stated that ratifying the charter is out of the question, since it 
was signed in different circumstances by a different Russian government. Additionally, 
although Russia has signed up to the Kyoto protocol, and officially remains committed 
to it, there are many in Russia who remain unconvinced of the science behind it. 
 
Prospects for a positive evolution in the relationship are also limited because the EU is 
itself divided. If the various constituents realise the problems, and agree on the need to 
develop a coherent policy, the difficulty remains in converting such consensus into 
practice – and bringing it together in a meaningful policy towards Russia. There are, for 
instance, clear differences in approaches between member states themselves: some 
states adopt more liberal approaches, while others support national energy champions; 
and member states and the Commission, as reflected in Mr. Barroso’s recent 
statements that more legislation was needed to guarantee increased access to Europe’s 
energy market and facilitate competition. Mr. Barroso also wants to strengthen the 
power of European energy regulation. 
 
Moreover, although the EU is attempting to develop a coherent and focused policy, it 
accepts that the member states themselves protect their rights to pursue their own 
external relations for ensuring the security of their energy supplies and to choose their 
own internal energy mix. This serves to undermine a coherent EU policy as member 
states seek to make their own arrangements with Russia, despite efforts to develop a 
coherent policy and the realisation that this weakens the EU’s negotiating position with 
Russia. In fact, it also weakens the position of member states vis-à-vis Russia, since 
individually, they do not carry as much weight in negotiations as the EU does. Both 
Germany and Italy have made separate deals with Russia. Indeed, there is clearly a 
growing lack of trust between some member states – exemplified by Polish concerns 
that the deal between Russia and Germany to build the Baltic Sea pipeline reflects a 
new Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and will allow the Russians to use energy as a lever 
against Poland and the Baltic States. 
 
Finally, there is no coherent joint policy on the EU side. Even if states or the EU itself 
begin to develop a coherent political strategy, this is currently being undermined by 
other actors, particularly in business. The flotation of Rosneft in London and Russia in 
the summer (and the capitalisation of Gazprom in January) showed the willingness of 
Western banks to invest great sums in Russian companies which strengthens the 
positions of these companies in the face of EU policies. 
 
As a result of these concerns, some have suggested that there should be a wider range 
of actors involved, including NATO. Introducing a military alliance into the equation 
would take energy security in Europe in a new direction. Furthermore, it would provide a 
forum to bring two key global energy actors more actively into the European energy 
discussion – the USA and Turkey. However, if it would bring US diplomatic weight to 
bear in negotiations, it remains unclear what NATO could bring to the issues of 
improving the prospects for Russian energy production. Moreover, if energy security 
became entwined with the debate about NATO enlargement to include Ukraine, the 
political situation would likely become less stable. 
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Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions       
Prospects are therefore mixed. It is unlikely that there will be a serious confrontation 
over energy, since it is too important for either side. It is also positive that Finland and 
Germany will head the Council during the next 12 months, therefore ensuring that 
Russia and energy security remain high on the EU’s agenda. However, only the first 
steps have been made in developing the relationship, and the PPCs and agreements at 
the G8 in the summer must be built on. Furthermore, the list of problems, both real and 
potential, is lengthy, and progress on resolving them is likely to be difficult. The two 
most significant problems for the EU in the medium term remain the sustainability of 
Russian gas reserves and the lack of clarity about a strategy for the development of the 
Russian energy sector.   33 












Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction       
The record of cooperation between the EU and Russia in the field of science, education 
and culture is mixed, but the prospects for the future are good. The negotiations on the 
four common spaces and the road map (described elsewhere) were not particularly 
difficult compared to those covering political, security and economic aspects. Most 
observers consider that this may be the first space to come ‘alive.’ Both the EU and 
Russia have an interest in developing closer cooperation in this area, as there are clear 
mutual advantages.  
 
Mutu Mutu Mutu Mutual interests al interests al interests al interests 
Russia inherited a strong scientific base from the Soviet Union, which was a world 
leader in research, space exploration, missile engineering, nuclear power and a number 
of other areas. Although the scientific sector was badly affected by the half-baked 
reforms and the economic crisis of the 1990s, it nevertheless maintained a 
considerable capacity that is now sought after by EU partners. Cooperation in this area 
is less vulnerable to political and ideological disagreements, with both sides seeming to 
recognise that it is a win-win situation.  
 
There is a similar attitude with regard to culture and education. Russia is the original 
European cultural superpower: Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Tchaikovsky and a great 
multitude of other talents belong not only to Russia but also to Europe and the whole 
world. The Cold War inhibited cooperation, but now there is enormous potential to make 
up for lost time. Moreover, it can help foster a better and deeper understanding, and 
pave the way to further economic and political rapprochement.  
 
Finally, as for the field of education, the starting positions for the establishment of a 
common space between Russia and EU are generally favourable, particularly as Russia 
is a participant in the Bologna process. Russian higher educational institutions seek the 
same transformations as elsewhere in Europe regarding mutual recognition of diplomas 
and standards of educational quality, with the ultimate aim of creating a common 
market for educational services. 
 
The road map The road map The road map The road map as motor   as motor   as motor   as motor        
The road map for education, culture and science is a rather vague document with no 
legal binding, or explicit indication of actions to be undertaken in the various areas. It 
should not be entirely under-estimated, however. In fact, the road map reflects the 
common viewpoint of Moscow and Brussels on how and what has to be done, and sets a 
number of milestones for future rapprochement between them in these areas.  
 
Compact and readable, the road map is divided into three parts. The first part is 
dedicated to cooperation in research, science and technology. In the second part a 
number of issues concerning construction of a common educational space are 
considered, while the third part dwells upon cooperation in the field of culture. 
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All three chapters are prefaced with a general preamble, which recalls the rich 
intellectual heritage of Russia and the EU, as well as their accumulated knowledge that 
can assist economic growth and economic competitiveness. The second goal of the 
preamble is more specific: it concerns activation of ties and exchanges. The road map is 
by no means exhaustive and reflects the 'package' nature of the agreements.  
 
The inner structures of each chapter of the road map are similar to a certain degree. 
The goals of interaction become more specific with the definition of certain priorities 
and spheres of cooperation. Organisational forms, mechanisms, procedures and 
concrete events are set down without any sense of priority, with the assumption that the 
work will be carried out simultaneously in many directions and within different 
frameworks. It is, however, evident that the establishment of appropriate bodies and 
structures within which cooperation can take place will need to precede other forms of 
activity.  
 
Science, research and  Science, research and  Science, research and  Science, research and technology technology technology technology       
The goal of constructing a common space for research, science and technology is to 
extend cooperation between Russia and the EU in mutually agreed priority fields, and to 
create more favourable conditions for the resolution of common tasks. Such tasks 
include education and training to improve competitiveness and economic growth, the 
protection of intellectual property, support of venture capital, and an increase in the 
quality of research. Predictably, the priority spheres comprise those fields where the 
Russian scientific and intellectual community is especially strong. These include 
research and use of outer space, new materials and nanotechnology, information 
technology, pure and renewable energy. 
 
As regards organisational structures, The Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) is the 
supreme body responsible for coordination and decision-making. At the operating level, 
there is a Russia-EU joint committee based on the Science and Technology Cooperation 
Treaty. This agreement was extended at the Rome summit in November 2003. The road 
map describes its functions in detail, including support for all forms of activity, 
performance control, preparation of new proposals, and for the assessment of the 
effectiveness of cooperation. A network of expert workshops is to engage in practical 
work on development and realisation of concrete projects.  
 
At the same time, the chapter stresses more effective use of already-functioning 
national, regional and international research programmes. It is assumed that the 
common space of scientific research between Russia and the EU could evolve from 
them. EU Framework Programmes, the International Association for the Promotion of 
Co-operation with Scientists from the New Independent States (NIS) of the Former 
Soviet Union (INTAS), Inter-University Scientific and Technology and Innovative 
Programmes (ISTC), the ТАСIS funding initiative, the ‘EUREKA’ educational programme 
and Russian federal research programmes are mentioned separately. The development 
path offered by the road map suggests mutual participation in programmes and 
projects, the lifting of restrictions and any discrimination that obstructs tendering 
processes, and network unification of scientific research structures and individual 
scientists. Naturally, simplification of exchanges, encouragement of mobility, etc. are 
also mentioned. 
 
To summarise, the chapter encourages the lifting of present administrative barriers that 
hinder cooperation between scientists, research and engineering organisations.  
 
Education Education Education Education       
The goals of the second chapter of the road map are dedicated to education and are 
basically orientated towards the Bologna process. The required parameters include the   35 
three level system of higher education, academic loans, European Credit Transfer and 
Accumulation System (ECTS) academic mobility for all who work in universities, 
European recognition of diplomas, quality control of higher education and, finally, the 
creation of a single European research space. Some proposals include a unified 
European marking system, active student involvement, social support of poor students 
and lifelong education. The Bologna process also has facultative parameters – there is 
harmonisation of education content on training directions, non-linear path of students’ 
education, optional courses and module systems, distance learning, e-learning courses, 
and academic ratings of students and professors.  
 
The core of the Bologna process is to erase the borders between European states 
concerning access to education and the provision of educational services. With time, a 
common education market is to emerge on the continent, which will have all the 
necessary attributes: demand oriented educational services, focus on quality, growth, 
competition. The aims include eventual mutual recognition of education quality in 
certified universities and other higher institutions; the possibility for everyone to receive 
education in any European country; and therefore equal opportunities for entering the 
pan-European labour market. The increased educational opportunities should also have 
an impact on competitiveness and the growth of the European economy. The success of 
the Bologna process is extremely important for all non-English speaking countries of the 
EU. It is also vital for the younger generation of Russians to have their national higher 
education diplomas acknowledged abroad.  
 
The road map identifies a number of procedures, tools, mechanisms and concrete 
events to achieve these goals. Specifically, the document does not suggest the creation 
of a multilevel management of cooperation. Rather, the negotiators decided to rely only 
on the organisational mechanism of the Bologna process itself. That is why they 
included in the document a provision about the use of regular ministerial meetings of 
the Bologna group as a practical mechanism for Russia-EU cooperation. This seems a 
logical step, as there is no special need to create duplicate bodies. The road map also 
mentions the possibility of Russia’s participation in other large-scale EU educational 
projects. Great importance is attached to the effective support of Russian language 
studies on the continent, and the study of EU member state languages in Russia. It is 
clear that without it, cooperation will always be hampered. Among the prospective 
spheres of cooperation mentioned are training and retraining of personnel in Russia to 
familiarise themselves with the EU, and to be able to work with it in a professional 
manner.  
 
Culture Culture Culture Culture       
The section of the road map devoted to ‘Culture’ is somewhat brief but this is not due to 
lack of cooperation, rather the opposite. One of the shortcomings of this section 
concerns the refusal to create specific government bodies. While efforts have been 
made to ensure efficient working of the Bologna process, little has been done for 
cooperation in the general cultural space. In 2006, the Russians therefore proposed 
broadening PPC powers and extending them to the cultural sphere, or the creation of 
another joint body for culture. The proposal is still under consideration and will probably 
be adopted, although not immediately. Regrettably the parties have failed to capitalise 
on the opportunities of the last few years.  
 
One of the goals of Russia-EU cultural cooperation is improving mutual knowledge and 
understanding of each other’s culture, with a special focus on strengthening the 
European identity and opportunities for synergy.  
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Interim results Interim results Interim results Interim results       
While outside observers view the results as modest, the official reaction in Moscow and 
Brussels is that the road map has achieved considerable practical results and the 
common space for science, education and culture is one of the most dynamically 
developing branches of cooperation between Russia and the EU. The road map has 
successfully built on earlier cooperation, particularly in the scientific-technical fields. It is 
worth remembering that Russia and the EU signed the first intergovernmental Science 
and Technology Cooperation Treaty some six years ago (extended in 2003), and that 
there was a 2002 action plan for cooperation in the same areas.  
 
In the area of education, the Bologna process has provided the necessary impetus for all 
European countries, including Russia, to adopt common standards for a higher 
education.  
 
Traditionally, there has been close cooperation between Russia and EU member states 
on cultural issues. 
 
In concrete terms, achievements include the launching of the Joint Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation Committee (JSTC), set up by the Science and Technology 
Cooperation Treaty of 2000. The first meeting took place on 23 May 2006 in Moscow.  
This year has also seen workshops on, inter alia, nanotechnology, food safety science, 
public health technology, etc. There are good prospects for workshops on non-nuclear 
energy and some other issues. EU-Russia cooperation on outer-space was taken to a 
whole new level in March 2006 with the launch of a tripartite dialogue that included the 
Russian Federal Space Agency, the European Commission and the European Space 
Agency (ESA). Within this framework, workshops will deal with major topics, including 
work already underway, such as the Soyuz Kourou project to launch European 
navigational satellites that bring together Russian and French commercial organisations 
and state structures. It also provides a forum for discussion of EU participation in the 
project to develop and exploit the ‘Clipper’ reusable spacecraft. 
 
Russia-EU scientific-technological cooperation also has great potential in the field of 
aircraft engineering. In April 2006, the heads of the Federal industry agency (Rosprom) 
and the State Air Traffic Control body (Rosaeronavigatsia) visited Brussels to discuss 
research of mutual interest such as EU participation in Russian projects on the 
development and modernisation of the aircraft industry. The parties agreed to explore 
further cooperation on projects related to the creation of the Russian regional jet 
(SuperJet) and Airbus. Russian and French companies have already developed a new 
generation engine for the Russian regional jet for which international certification is 
already underway. These projects have good prospects but do, however, require 
appropriate and long-term funding, which is why there has primarily been a focus on 
establishing financial security. They will, in all probability, need to turn to the European 
Investment Bank for assistance.  
 
Participation of Russian scientific and academic teams in the sixth EU Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological development also continues. Currently, they 
are involved in over 60 projects that mainly concern outer space, aircraft, information 
society technologies, conservation, biotechnologies and nuclear safety. The participation 
of Russian scientists and academic teams in the seventh EU Framework programme 
(2007-2013) is still in its initial phase.  
 
Many in Russia believe that this is not enough. In the field of science and technology, 
Russia and the EU have many common priorities and it would be advantageous for the 
EU to focus on helping Russia create and develop research parks. Russian participation   37 
in EU scientific tenders, as well as access to funding for joint projects, could form an 
important part of future cooperation.  
 
This kind of cooperation in the field of research and technology could help create a 
common space that responds more closely to the needs of both parties. Creating a 
common space for education does not face the same problems as those associated 
with science and technology where the parties have to find ways to bring together 
completely different infrastructures. The European space for higher education is clearly 
defined and participants know what is required. An important aspect is that all 
European countries, EU members and third countries are on equal terms, and progress 
depends entirely on individual efforts.  
 
With the introduction of Bologna standards in Russia, the processes are exactly the 
same as those taking place in other European countries. Like other European countries, 
Russia is adjusting to the requirements of the Bologna process within the context of 
national traditions and needs. It is therefore gradually introducing a two level bachelor 
degree and a system of academic credits. This is not an easy process and has met 
opposition from those who believe that it will lead to a dumbing down of academic 
standards and that it is inferior to the old Soviet system. But Moscow made its choice in 
favour of full acceptance and equal participation in the creation of the European space 
for higher education, and there is no reason to assume that it will reverse this decision.   
 
It would be a mistake, however, to view the creation of a common education space only 
by means of the Bologna process. Russia and the EU are very different, not least in their 
administrative structure, and both have an inclination to insularity. Building a common 
space in the field of education is grandiose. Help that could be expected from such 
short-run programmes like ‘Tempus’, ‘Erasmus Mundus’ or ‘Youth’ is welcome, but is in 
no way sufficient to meet the volume of need. These programmes can only provide 
short-term assistance and more resources will be needed to ensure an improvement in 
the overall situation of higher education.  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union has meant that Russia’s cultural influence has been 
dramatically reduced. The Russian language, as a subject and a medium of instruction, 
is now much less in demand than before. Russian higher educational institutions are 
not generally able to offer programmes in other languages. Changing course content is 
a slow process and suffers from a lack of funding. Funding for academic chairs is hard 
to come by, while in the country itself, specialists graduating from prestigious Western 
universities are in great demand. Russia has a negative image in the rest of Europe and 
this has reduced the flow of people travelling to get an education there. Adjustment to 
the Bologna process would seem to be a one-way street for Moscow.  
 
For Russia to receive the same benefits from participation in the Bologna process as 
other European countries, serious additional supportive measures will be necessary. So 
far they have been insufficient. What is needed is funding to support student and 
teacher mobility, partnerships with the private sector to modernise the system, and 
programmes to demonstrate how to participate in EU tenders for inter-university 
educational, technical and research projects.  
 
There have, however, been some joint educational programmes with foreign partners 
that have included traineeships abroad, the granting of double diplomas, gaining of 
foreign experience, and support from foreign charity funds and state structures, and 
they are becoming more common. These programmes should be of interest to partners 
in EU countries and could form the basis of future long-term cooperation.  
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The European Institute The European Institute The European Institute The European Institute       
A major achievement of the road map is the European Studies Institute at the Moscow 
State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) - University, commonly known as the 
‘Russian College of Europe’. It was established by the government of the Russian 
Federation and the European Commission on a parity basis as a kind of third College of 
Europe, with the task of preparing a new generation of Russian civil servants familiar 
with the EU. It is hoped that this joint financing model can be used for similar projects.  
 
At the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, the Institute held its first joint short-term 
courses with the College of Europe for Russian civil servants, and later that year, 
commenced a Masters programme. The first meeting of the joint supervisory board took 
place in September 2006, and the official opening ceremony with senior Russian and 
EU officials took place on October 23.  
 
Beginning in 2007, the Institute will retrain several hundred young Russian civil servants 
for work with EU partners. The Institute will also be open to citizens of other countries 
who are either public servants or from the private sector or non-profit organisations and 
who are interested in acquiring professional knowledge about EU law, economy and 
politics and how they are assessed in Russia. The fact that Moscow and Brussels regard 
this as a priority is a demonstration of their desire for a long-term strategic partnership.  
Cooperation between Russia and the EU in the field of culture also has a bright future. It 
will not only complement Russia’s cultural ties with all other European countries but 
also encourage their expansion. Given that the necessary administrative base is now in 
place, one can begin to speak more optimistically about future progress in this area. 
Some of the prerequisites for establishing a Permanent Council of Partnership are in 
place. In Spring 2006, an agreement was reached on the creation of a number of 
workshops to cover modern art, cinematography, archiving, design, fashion and style, 
etc. The parties also agreed to a series of round table discussions, seminars and 
festivals that would bring together diverse populations in the area of culture.  
 
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion       
There is a mixed picture regarding cooperation in the common space for science, 
education and culture. There have been some achievements and some setbacks. But 
the prospects are good and that is something both sides can agree on. 
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In 2005 the European Union (EU) adopted the Hague programme which marked the 
beginning of the second stage of construction for the 'Common Space' of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. One of the key conditions for the success of the Hague programme 
is intensifying cooperation with third parties, including Russia. An example of this is the 
idea of moving to a visa-free regime with Europe which emerged during the negotiations 
on the Kaliningrad transition. This has become a powerful incentive for Russia to create 
conditions for visa-free travel for their own citizens. The formation of a common internal 
security space would meet the interests of Russia and the EU. However, many experts 
doubted whether success in this sensitive area would be feasible given the discrepancy 
between the parties’ ideas of common values and human rights, and in their respective 
approaches to terrorism.  
 
Recent developments, however, reveal quite intense activity within the framework of the 
common space after the adoption of the corresponding road map in May, 2005. This 
chapter seeks to assess not only the concrete results of cooperation but also looks 
ahead to the future prospects for building the common space. It is interesting to note 
that international criminal organisations have already developed their common space - 
the EU and Russia’s cooperation in fighting organised crime should be regarded among 
top priorities in their relations.  
 
The Action Plan The Action Plan The Action Plan The Action Plan       
The EU has cooperated with Russia in building the EU space of freedom, security and 
justice since the mid 1990s . In creating the internal security road map the parties drew 
on the existing political and legal base. Article 84 (title VIII, "Cooperation On Prevention 
Of Illegal Activities") of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement provides for the 
parties to cooperate in fighting illegal migration, economic crime, drug trafficking, 
counterfeiting, and other illegal transactions. The need for joint efforts in the internal 
security sphere was justified in a number of strategic documents including the Russia-
EU plan on combating organised crime (1997); EU Common strategy on Russia (1999); 
Strategy on the development of relations between Russia and EU (2000-2001).  
 
Additionally, the EU-Russia Action plan on combating organised crime, adopted at the 
EU summit in Helsinki in 1999 and approved by the EU-Russia Cooperation Council in 
2000, was based upon these preceding common initiatives. The plan implied 
ratification and implementation of international agreements on combating crime, 
including European conventions against money laundering and drug trafficking. It also 
identified another sphere of common interest – the cooperation of law enforcement 
organisations, including information exchange and personnel training.  
 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement allotted cooperation in this field to 
Subcommittee 6 which is in charge of competition issues, intellectual property 
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protection, and approximation of legislation. The responsibilities of the subcommittee 
are extensive and that is why experts have been raising the question of the usefulness 
of creating a special subcommittee on cooperation in the law enforcement sphere. 
Regular meetings between the EU and Russia take place with the participation of justice 
and internal affairs ministers, while ministers also meet within the framework of the EU-
Russia Permanent Partnership Council. 
 
In 2001 and 2003 Russia and the EU adopted joint statements on international 
terrorism. They agreed to create conditions for exchanging information about the 
activity of individuals and terrorist groups, forged documents, and arms supplies. They 
also declared their determination to strengthen cooperation for prevention and 
suppression of terrorist acts, in particular through full implementation of corresponding 
international conventions and resolutions of the UN Security Council. During the EU-
Russia summit, in November 2003, an agreement with Europol was signed which 
defined the tools of cooperation in strategic and technical information sharing. 
 
Road map  Road map  Road map  Road map        
The road map was built on the model of the Helsinki Plan for common action for 
combating organised crime. It determines goals and spheres of cooperation, based 
upon the parties’ achievements in combating organised crime both at the bilateral level 
(police and legal cooperation with EU countries) and on an international scale.  
 
The goal of building this common space is to create a pan-European mechanism for 
combating international crime, an area which has been less developed so far than inter-
governmental cooperation. One has to remember, however, that police cooperation, 
combating crime and terrorism in the EU are under the authority of national states, 
while Europol's role as an intergovernmental body is limited to information sharing and 
analysis. Russia and the European Union have recognised the need to form an internal 
security space alongside prospective changes to a visa-free regime. 
  
The road map fixes the common principles of the internal security space: adherence of 
the parties to common values: democracy, rule of law and an independent judiciary; 
equality of partners and mutual respect for interests and human rights. Both sides are 
keen to provide a balance between security, on the one hand, and justice and freedom 
on the other hand. 
 
The first field of that cooperation – ‘freedom’ – seeks to ‘promote personal contacts and 
travel’ and to counteract illegal migration. Prospects for a visa-free regime are rather 
vague: the document only says that opportunities for moving towards it in the longer 
term will be explored. The parties expect to reach concrete results through signing 
agreements on the facilitation of visa and readmission procedures for certain groups of 
citizens. 
 
The main goal of the second area – ‘security’ – is the fight against terrorism and all 
forms of organised crime; as well as defining priorities for cooperation between police 
bodies. The key priority also manifested by the external security common space road 
map is the fight against terrorism based on Russia and EU joint statements and within 
the limits of the UN. For instance, the parties expect to complete the work on the UN 
comprehensive draft convention on international terrorism in 2007. Meanwhile, the 
road map does not mention a common EU-Russia definition of terrorism or an agreed 
list of terrorist organisations. It is clear that lack of common understanding of what 
terrorism is and who can be called a terrorist is hampering practical cooperation in 
fighting this threat.  
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The second priority of the ‘Security’ chapter for Russia and the EU is counteracting trans-
border criminality: money laundering, trafficking in drugs or people, corruption, stolen 
vehicles, etc. One of the recognised counter measures to combat criminality is a need to 
enhance the security of citizens’ documents and identity cards. It is suggested that 
cooperation on this matter would be helped through interaction with Europol (based on 
the current and proposed new Agreements) as well as with other European and 
international organisations.  
 
Finally, the third area of focus – ‘justice’ seeks to ‘help increase the effectiveness of 
judicial systems and promote the independence courts in Russia and EU member states 
as well as the development of judicial cooperation’. The priority areas concern 
cooperation on judicial reform and improving cooperation on criminal and civil cases. To 
achieve these goals the parties intend to explore the possibility of making further 
agreements, as well as improving work experience exchanges and additional training of 
coordinators, judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials. 
The Permanent Partnership Council monitors progress of the road map and helps 
organise meetings between foreign and justice ministers and other experts. In addition, 
there is informal dialogue between the coordinator of Russia's internal security space 
and their counterpart in the EU commission.  
 
Prospects Prospects Prospects Prospects       
At the 21 March, 2006 meeting of the Permanent Partnership Council, Russia and the 
EU agreed the next steps for the implementation of the road map. A number of priority 
areas were identified, including:  
 
•  Fight against terrorism: Fight against terrorism: Fight against terrorism: Fight against terrorism: protection of infrastructures, readiness for counteraction 
(including training of special units), planning for emergency situations and 
information exchange; measures to counter the financing of terrorism.  
•  Countering cybercrime Countering cybercrime Countering cybercrime Countering cybercrime,  
•  Document security assistance,  Document security assistance,  Document security assistance,  Document security assistance, including a step-by-step approach to introduce 
biometric data in a number of identity documents.  
•  Frontier cooperation: Frontier cooperation: Frontier cooperation: Frontier cooperation: development of cooperation between European agency 
FRONTEX and the Federal Frontier Service of the Russian Federation.  
•  Fight against money laundering Fight against money laundering Fight against money laundering Fight against money laundering 
•  Judicial cooperation on civil cases.  Judicial cooperation on civil cases.  Judicial cooperation on civil cases.  Judicial cooperation on civil cases.  
 
On May 25, 2006 at the Russia-EU summit in Sochi, agreement was reached on the 
simplification of the visa issue for Russian citizens and on readmissions. Since these 
are the first documents that lead towards the objectives of the road map it is worth 
taking a closer look at them.  
 
The first agreement suggests a simplified visa requirement (in terms of a written 
statement from the recipient) for business travellers; participants in scientific, cultural 
and sports exchanges; journalists, students and teachers, as well as people who work in 
international transportation/deliveries. Close relatives of individuals residing in Russia 
or the EU would also be included. In accordance with the Agreement, these categories of 
citizens will be able to use multiple visas with validity of up to five years. Diplomatic 
passports holders already have the right to stay on the territory of EU member states 
without a visa for up to 90 days in every six month period. The preamble of the 
Agreement announces the intention to provide visa-free travelling for citizens in the 
longer term.  
 
Within the Agreement on readmission, Russia and the EU have agreed to re-admit any 
individual who resides illegally on the other's territory. The Agreement is coming into 
force step by step: first, readmission only covers citizens illegally living on the other's   42 
territory. However, Russia is not likely to face difficulties with this category: there are 
few Russian citizens who illegally enter EU countries. Besides, the legality of this 
requirement is unquestionable: international law dictates that a country must re-admit 
its own citizens.  
 
However, it will be much more difficult to conform to another requirement of the 
Agreement: as soon as the corresponding bilateral arrangements on readmission with 
third countries are signed, or after a three year period, the EU-Russia readmission 
agreement will affect the third countries’ nationals. Moscow believes that these 
negotiations will be successful but there are no guarantees that during this period 
Russia will be able to reach agreements on readmission with its southern neighbours, 
although negotiations are underway. Where such agreements are made, Russia will still 
face the financial burden of deporting illegal immigrants. So will Russia be able to stop 
the flow of illegal immigrants to the EU? The answer seems quite definite: Russia can 
never do it on its own, however secure its frontier. 
 
Illegal frontier crossing has long been a very large and profitable business for 
international criminal groups in both Russia and the EU. Strengthening frontier regimes 
will not pose an obstacle to their activity. The methods used by Frontier Services are 
already outdated; it is necessary to use new technologies, navigation systems that 
monitor the movement of humans through transportation channels from country of 
origin to the final destination. It is the final stage of their journey, as they travel through 
the territory of the destination country, that is illegal. As long as there is a demand for 
illegal labour, prostitution, child pornography in EU countries and in Russia, and as long 
as there is a huge supply of “the human commodity” at the East-Southern regions and 
within Russia, international criminals will exploit Russia’s transit position to their best 
advantage. 
  
Under such conditions, Russia’s law against human trafficking is unlikely to succeed. 
Often the export of women for prostitution from Russia and neighbouring countries is 
conducted legally. In order to stop illegal immigration it is necessary to tackle the supply 
in Russia’s southern neighbouring countries, transit through Russia and demand in 
Russia and EU countries, where many potential victims of human trafficking who legally 
pass the frontier are subsequently deprived of their passports, have their contracts 
conditions altered and take on illegal immigrant status. 
 
C C C Cooperating in the exchange of information and intelligence data is a top priority to 
counteract illegal immigration and drug trafficking. This could be combined with 
operations at the level of national states under the auspices of international 
organisations. That’s why cooperation with Europol on exchange of not only strategic 
(analytical), but also personal, information is vital for Russia.              
 
This very agreement on protecting personal data is discussed within the framework of 
the dialogue conducted by Russia’s Interior Ministry with Europol. This agreement will 
allow states an opportunity to exchange personal information necessary for the 
identification of criminal groups and their structures. It became possible to sign such an 
agreement after the State Duma in July 2006 adopted a federal law which sought to set 
out Russia’s international responsibilities under the Council of Europe’s Convention for 
the protection of personal data in 1981 (Data Protection).  
 
An important event in the implementation of ‘the road map’ is the adoption of the 
federal law and the ‘ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention 
of terrorism’ by the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Russia has insisted on the 
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terrorism, which could help avoid the gaps and uncertainties related to the regulation of 
certain aspects of the problem in different international agreements.  
 
In addition, Russia and the EU have also conducted a number of dialogues intended to 
be completed by signing sectoral agreements. In the framework of the dialogue with the 
Frontex Agency, the rules for cooperation between the Agency and the Russian border 
security service are set down. In the course of the dialogue about countering the drug 
threat, the Russian Federal Drug Control Agency (FSKN), on the one hand, and the 
European drugs and drug addiction monitoring centre and Europol, on the other, agreed 
to develop their cooperation further. The dialogue also contributes to FSKN and 
Europol’s consultations in the Hague on combating the movement synthetic drugs.  
 
Within the framework of a special dialogue, conditions have been laid down to prepare 
an agreement between Russia and Eurojust, as well as with the European judicial 
network in civil and commercial matters. So far, cooperation in the justice sphere has 
been the least developed part of the Russia-EU relationship. Contact between Russia 
and Eurojust only started at the end of 2003 and, until recently, only took place in single 
specific cases. Russia has taken certain steps to fulfil its responsibilities as a member 
of the Council of Europe; such as the transfer of the management of penitentiary 
institutions and supervision for executions from the Interior Ministry to the Justice 
Ministry and the conformity of the criminal-executive system to European standards.  
 
The mechanism of permanent consultations of Russia and the EU on human rights 
issues is also in place but hasn't yielded any tangible results so far. The main 
achievement in this sphere is the mere fact that the dialogue is taking place, in the 
course of which not only problems inside Russia and the EU are discussed, but global 
issues as well - for example, through the creation of the UN Human Rights Council 
(Russia was elected as a member in May 2006).  
 
By cooperating with the EU and the Council of Europe within the framework of ‘the road 
map’ as well as with other international organisations, and by signing dozens of 
international human rights conventions and agreements, Russia has admitted that 
human rights violations are not solely an internal matter.  
 
As Vladimir Lukin, Human Rights Commissioner of the Russian Federation, fairly 
pointed out ‘in order to defend yourself from human rights pressure from ‘sly’ 
neighbours you should fully abide by the responsibilities taken in human rights and 
fundamental freedoms observance. This is, first and foremost, in our own interests’. At 
the same time, in his report on the human rights situation in Russia for 2005, he 
conceded that the situation in this sphere is ‘unsatisfactory’, despite ‘some positive 
changes’. Lukin also pointed out that the Russian court system is expensive and 
exclusive due to the high costs of lawyers. 
  
The Public Chamber, under the President of the Russian Federation, agrees with the 
opinion of the Russian ombudsman, that it is especially concerned with law 
enforcement practice. Complaints of bad quality legal proceedings or delays in the 
implementation of rulings are cited in most of the Russians’ requests received by the 
European Court of Human Rights. Yet ten years ago the possibility of taking legal action 
wasn’t even considered by Russian citizens.  
 
At present, in spite of the existing problems with judicial proceedings, Russians have 
started appealing more actively, not only to national courts but to the European Court of 
Human Rights. In turn, commenting on the European court’s ruling in the ‘Bazorkina 
against Russia’ case, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed its hope that 'all the   44 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights will be taken without any politicisation 
and on the grounds of an objective and unbiased approach.' 
 
In 2005 over 10,500 complaints from Russia were received by the European court – 
23% of the total number of appeals, and the flow of complaints from Russia grew by 
40% for the previous year. The appeals of Russians are serious and diverse: 
  
•  There is still evidence of violations of the rights of the residents of Chechnya; for 
example, the above mentioned ‘Bazorkina against Russia’ case which a Chechen 
woman citizen won in July 2006.  
•  There are also complaints of beatings and tortures carried out by the police in the 
‘Mikheev case,’ lodged by a Nizhny Novgorod resident.  
•  There are appeals against violations of the set down procedure of judicial 
proceedings. For example, Platon Lebedev’s appeal against being held in custody 
without court sanction for a week in 2004.  
•  There are complaints about federal and municipal authorities, like the one, sent to 
the European Court by the Plotnikov family who were unhappy about delay in 
pension entitlements and failure of the local authorities to fulfil the court’s ruling.  
•  Five residents of the city of Khabarovsk appealed to the European Court demanding 
compensation entitlements for those who helped during the Chernobyl atomic 
energy station emergency and the resulting damage to their health. They accused 
federal and local authorities of inaction. ‘The Ecological case’ was won by a resident 
of Cherepovets City, a metallurgical centre, who demanded to be relocated from the 
contaminated region of the city.  
 
Besides, Russians understand that the European Court of Human Rights is capable of 
protecting their interests abroad. Thus, the Court’s ruling in favour of Russian football 
player, Igor Simutenkov, who asserted his right to work on the same terms as EU 
citizens under the provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between EU 
and Russia, is very popular in Russia.  
   
The subject and quality of Russians’ complaints to the European Court creates an 
obstacle in itself. 95% of all the appeals get sifted out at the very first stage. Russians’ 
lack of legal culture and a lack of specialist qualified lawyers complicate the problem. 
The human rights problem in Russia has to do with improvement in the legal education 
and awareness of the people. In Spring 2006 the project’s second stage began, 
suggesting the education of Russian judges, legal administrators and court officers in 
five regions of Russia about European standards. However, as is the case in many 
educational initiatives in Russia there is a need to understand how that new knowledge 
can be applied to Russian reality and how to allow the harmonisation of judicial 
practices to happen. The conditions of that harmonisation are being discussed between 
the Russian Justice Ministry and Eurojust.  
 
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion       
A series of sectoral agreements on concrete issues of interaction in the sphere of 
internal security could be the basis of a special section of the new agreement between 
Russia and the EU which may replace the current Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement. It is clear that the new agreement will require a much greater focus on the 
cooperation in the field of internal security - the need for which has intensified in recent 
years.  
 
One of the priorities for internal security remains the establishment of a visa-free 
regime between Russia and the EU. Only a few years ago this idea seemed utopian but 
now the agenda contains consultations on the conditions of visa-free travel for citizens. 
However, it seems that, the visa-free regime is not the most valuable element of the   45 
internal security space. Consolidation of cooperation with the EU in the fight against 
organised crime, especially with drug trafficking that has become a threat to national 
security, is vital for Russia. It is necessary to establish international responsibilities – 
signing, ratifying and implementing a number of conventions which are also provided by 
the ‘road map’ in order to create a civil society in Russia. The fight against corruption is 
of primary importance as it is a serious obstacle to democratic development.  
 
Of course, the notion ‘common space’ already suggests a certain degree of 
harmonisation of the legislative and practical actions of the partners. This is a very 
lengthy process, dialogues may be protracted and results are unlikely to be achieved 
soon. It should be borne in mind that the EU space of freedom, security and justice was 
itself created with great difficulty especially after its enlargement. The drive to 
coordinate efforts to counter security threats will be contained in concrete agreements 
and steps are being taken to move this forward.  
 
The most important common interest of the EU and Russia is security – this is the main 
theme in the development of their relationship. The most important condition for the 
space to function is the equal responsibility of both partners to provide security for the 
citizens of Russia and the EU.    46 













Russia’s ruling system is organised around small groups of individuals directly related to 
Vladimir Putin or to one of his very close aides and friends. Institutions and institutional 
mechanisms have become less and less relevant because authority is determined by 
the financial and political power of a few who are accountable to no one but their own 
patrons. Who in Russia today talks of ministers or governors or Constitutional Court 
judges as significant, responsible actors in the government of their country? Their 
effective role largely depends on the personal and financial ties that each has secured 
with the Putin leadership. 
 
The gas crisis of the winter 2005-2006 bluntly illustrates this point. Behind the obvious 
desire on the part of the Kremlin to weaken “post-orange” Ukraine, the financial 
interests of various Russian and Ukrainian actors fuelled the dispute. And the crisis is 
not over. 
 
Another clear symptom of the de-institutionalisation and democratic regression in 
Russian politics is the 2008 deadline when Vladimir Putin’s second term ends (the 
1993 Constitution permits no third term but a revision would very easily be adopted by 
the loyal Parliament). Will Vladimir Putin stay in power, one way or another, or will he 
choose and sponsor a “successor”, and whom? These are the primitive terms in which 
the next electoral cycle is discussed and analysed. Kremlin officials and 
“polittekhnologi” (spin doctors, heads of “think tanks” and Kremlin-supported public 
opinion centres) talk and write feverishly about “the succession” (preemstvennost’) but 
hardly mention elections. The choice of the next President is not expected to be 
arbitrated by the 107 million-odd Russian voters but by deals negotiated behind closed 
doors. 
 
The authoritarian and clannish nature of the Russian regime today raises much 
concern. Not only do the ruling groups undermine fundamental liberties and rights, they 
operate a power system that is opaque with no clear, transparent rules. Contrary to the 
conventional speech about his presidency, Vladimir Putin has not consolidated state 
institutions but personal and corporatist interests and networks. Society is not an actor 
but rather an impediment to the perpetuity of the unaccountable power system, hence 
the growing control over media and information, and the limitations on free economic 
competition. The Russian people are not expected to choose between several serious 
candidates in a pluralistic election, but to rubberstamp the leadership’s decision with 
their ballots. This creates more instability than stability since the decision lies in the 
hands of a few men whose interests may clash. 
 
Russian officials and “semi-officials” keep on defending their regime by claiming the 
“specificity” of Russia. “Our democracy is in Russian colours,” said Sergey 
Yastrzhembsky at a European Union-Russia Forum in Vilnius on 23 March, 2006. He 
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stressed that western democracy is not above Russian democracy, and that 
Lukashenko won a third term in a free and fair election in Belarus on 19 March. 
 
If we in Europe, in the West, accept this slippery paradigm of Russia’s specificity – with 
its cohort of leitmotivs: “sovereign democracy,” “managed democracy,” “democracy for 
the people” - we accept that we no longer have any interest in promoting more 
openness, more pluralism, more respect for the rule of law in Russia. Consequently, we 
abandon the ambition of forging a constructive, secure and long-lasting relationship 
with Russia. And we let the Russian government close itself up in a system of its own, 
with its own logic, and convince their population that the world is hostile, even 
neighbouring Europe, and that they should go their “Russian way”, disregarding the 
advantages of free exchanges, active cooperation and common security. 
 
Globalisation is accepted in the West as an inevitable process that may challenge 
national policies but cannot be stopped. One has to adapt to it. The enlargement of the 
European Union, that has set no geographical or cultural limit to future extension, is 
another historical process that some would like to halt but that no one seriously 
considers to be reversible. 
 
In Russia, both phenomena are seen as challenging, even threatening and hostile, to 
the national interest and the future of the country. The leading political elite build their 
domestic rhetoric on the illegitimate and dangerous pursuit of those processes. They 
participate in neither of these historical developments. Europe has been extending 
eastwards, has three new member states that are former Soviet republics (the Baltic 
states) and has a border with the Russian Federation. Other former Soviet territories are 
engaged in a close partnership with the EU and may join in the medium term. To many 
Russians, Europe’s “conquest” is Russia’s “loss.” "The Kremlin's hostile and 
counterproductive reaction to the "orange revolution" and the anti-Georgian crusade in 
the fall of 2006 illustrate this policy of denial in the relationship with the former Soviet 
republics that fight for their full sovereignty." 
 
The Russian leadership seems to be often at odds with general trends in Europe but 
continues to be supported by most West European governments. Why? There are a 
number of well-known explanations: energy dependence on Russian hydrocarbons; 
cooperation with Moscow on non-proliferation issues; Western fears of the unknown 
after Putin (if the President quits in 2008); a form of counterweight to the US dominant 
position and “unilateralism”. 
 
There is another reason for the EU’s inability to forge a common foreign policy toward 
Russia. It is the lack of commitment, the lack of energy and invention devoted to the 
relationship with Russia in major EU countries, like France and Britain. Russia is almost 
like a frozen issue that only the gas crisis, in the first days of 2006, thawed, but only to a 
limited extent. The governments of the main old European states do not have a clear 
forward strategy of their own. They are defensive towards Putin’s administration and are 
not ready to take risks to promote a more interactive relationship with the Kremlin. They 
do not engage in the relationship. Consequently, the tools for understanding are 
rudimentary and the modes of action are often obsolete or inadequate. Long-term 
strategic planning is absent.  
 
For their part, the Russian leadership remain defensive too. They hardly ever make any 
serious proposals to the EU and no momentum seems to be coming from them. Hence, 
any new dynamics in the EU-Russia partnership will have to come from the enlarged 
Europe, with a key role played by the new member states which are more outspoken, 
sometimes very critical, of the Russian behaviour but at least express real concerns and 
put issues on the table. Engaging Russia is better than leaving it on the other side of the   48 
fence, wrapped up in its own contradictions. The stakes, for our societies and for the 
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